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Systemic Racism: Patterns of Black
Disadvantage and White Advantage
Linked to Slavery
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Every truth passes through three stages before it is recognized. In the
first stage it is ridiculed, in the second it is opposed, in the third it is regarded
as self-evident.
Arthur Schoppenhauer (1788-1860)1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Complex ideas are easy targets for ridicule or objection, especially
when the distractors, persons or organizations, are politically motivated,
ignorant, indifferent, hostile to the subject, or simply indisposed toward
nuanced analysis.2 In this Article, I engage a complex concept—systemic
racism.3 Though complex, systemic racism is not inscrutable to most

2. The idea of racial justice has certainly run this gauntlet. Some still argue that
the country does not have a race problem. While they acknowledge the existence of racial
inequality in our country, they attribute this problem to the behavior and values of African
Americans. For these detractors, the issue is one of class rather than one of race. With
the death of Jim Crow—government-sanctioned or mandated racial discrimination and
segregation—and the concomitant rise of equal rights as the law of the land in the 1960s,
racial inequality in post-civil rights America is, they assert, sustained by the internal
problems of African Americans. If we were facing a race problem, they continue, there is
no way an African American could have been elected President of the United States not
only once but twice or that an Afro-Indian could have been elected Vice President. In
short, race no longer matters in the African American’s chances for worldly success and
personal happiness. See generally ROY L. BROOKS, RACIAL JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF OBAMA
14–34 (2009). I reject this argument without reservation. Race still matters in the push
for racial equality or equity in our country today. While African Americans have
experienced individual success since the end of Jim Crow, the great majority of African
Americans are still limited by their race, by the fact that they are black. For example, since
the end of Jim Crow, college educated black men have done everything conservatives say
African Americans should be doing, yet during this entire time they have earned less than
their white counterparts. Id. at 29, 148 (fig. 38). In fact, this racial wage is larger today
than it was at the beginning of Jim Crow. See infra note 19 and accompanying text. While
internal factors may contribute to the problem of racial disadvantage, many of these factors
are conditioned by external circumstances. They are exogenous. See BROOKS, supra, at
30. External circumstances are the main reasons racial disadvantage continues to exist
well into the post-Jim Crow period. Some of these structural obstacles are baked into our
society or mainstream institutions, which gives an advantage to, or privileges, straight
white males. “Systemic racism” refers to this insidious structural condition. See infra Part
III.
3. The complexity of the concept was brought to light when Vice President
Kamala Harris suggested in a nationally televised interview that the country is not racist
but systemic racism still exists. Vice President Harris, a Democrat, agreed with Republican
Senator Tim Scott—both African Americans—that “[n]o, I don’t think America is a racist
country,” but disagreed with Senator Scott on the matter of whether systemic racism exists.
Mark Moore, Kamala Harris Says US Not a ‘Racist Country,’ Warns of White Supremacist
Threat, N.Y. POST (Apr. 29, 2021, 11:00 AM) https://nypost.com/2021/04/29/vp-kamalaharris-says-us-is-not-a-racist-country/ [https://perma.cc/RMM4-KYWN]. The senator
asserted that although he had experienced plenty of racism, including having his car
stopped by the police repeatedly, he did not believe systemic racism existed because he
was able to climb out of poverty to become a U.S. Senator. Text of Sen. Tim Scott’s GOP
Response to Biden Speech, ASSOCIATED P RESS (Apr. 28, 2021), https://apnews.com/
article/tim-scott-joe-biden-business-race-and-ethnicity-health-789601bb6410b675 6358893
bea33d5a9 [https://perma.cc/2DCL-EGN9]. In response to that argument, Vice President
Harris said: “But we also do have to speak truth about the history of racism in our country
and its existence today.”
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African Americans. We have come to understand the concept all-too-well
as its meaning is rooted in the black experience. Staying close to that
ethos, I define systemic racism in this Article as deeply embedded patterns
of racial disadvantage in our country linked to slavery. These patterns of
racial inequality are structural rather than behavioral, external rather than
internal. They continuously disadvantage African Americans and,
concomitantly, advantage white Americans.4
My definition of systemic racism as embedded patterns of racial
degradation linked to slavery is consistent with other definitions of the
term. For example, the Oxford English Dictionary defines systemic racism
as: “Discrimination or unequal treatment on the basis of membership in a
particular ethnic group (typically one that is a minority or marginalized),
arising from systems, structures, or expectations that have become established
within society or an institution.” 5 Joe Feagin, arguably the leading civil
rights scholar in the country, defines systemic racism as the operation of
dominant “white-framed perspectives” that disadvantage a racial group.6

Moore, supra note 3. White supremacists are “one of the greatest threats to our national
security.” Id. It could be argued that the country is not racist in the sense that the vast
majority of white Americans no longer think of our country as “a white man’s country.”
See, e.g., ROY L. BROOKS, THE RACIAL GLASS CEILING: SUBORDINATION IN AMERICAN LAW
AND C ULTURE 104 (2017) (discussing that even the Supreme Court at one time viewed
“America as a white society,” but, of course, today the Court is committed to racial
democracy). Racism refers to a state of mind while systemic racism refers to a state of
conditions. See infra text accompanying notes 11, 15–24. Critical race theorists would,
however, argue that the existence of systemic racism itself—defined by them as “antiobjectivism,” or the country’s constructed slant in favor of straight white men, “insiders”
—renders the country itself “racist.” See, e.g., DOROTHY A. BROWN, CRITICAL RACE
THEORY : CASES, M ATERIALS, AND P ROBLEMS 5 (3d ed. 2021). From the victim’s
perspective, there is no difference in the distinction between racism and systemic racism.
See id. Most of my students agree with the critical race theorists. Again, this is not a
discussion for those who only wish to engage simple ideas.
4. But for racism, systemic racism would not have come into existence in this
country. Systemic racism is one of the badges or incidents of slavery to which Justice
William O. Douglas referred in his famous opinion in Jones v. Alfred H. Meyer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 445 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring). This case resurrected a statute from the
Reconstruction Era which became an important law in the current struggle for racial justice
in this country. Id. at 412–13.
5. Systemic Racism, LEXICO, www.lexico.com/en/definition/systemic_racism [https://
perma.cc/77R7-QDD6].
6. See KIMBERLEY DUCEY & JOE R. FEAGIN, REVEALING BRITAIN’S SYSTEMIC
RACISM: THE CASE OF MEGHAN MARKLE AND THE ROYAL FAMILY, at xi (2021). See
generally JOE R. FEAGIN & KIMBERLEY DUCEY, RACIST AMERICA: ROOTS, CURRENT
REALITIES, AND FUTURE REPARATIONS 18, 98 (4th ed. 2019).
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Those who see the world through the white-framed perspective see
nothing wrong with the failure of whites to redistribute the poker chips.7
Thus, systemic racism means racial disadvantage firmly ingrained in the
very fiber of our cultural paradigm—our country’s traditions, values,
beliefs, stories, and myths.
Systemic racism has always had a presence in our country.8 Its presence
was easy to discern during slavery given the horrid treatment of blacks
both within and outside the peculiar institution. The same is true of Jim
Crow with the ubiquity of “Colored” restrooms or drinking fountains,
“white-only” sections of public transportation and lunch counters, window
signs that read, “Negroes need not apply.”9 Fifty years after Jim Crow,
systemic racism—embedded patterns of racial disadvantage—is perceived or
recognized in a different way. It is manifested in less obvious ways.10
This is mainly because animus is not nearly as associated with system
racism today as it was during slavery or Jim Crow. Yet, while animus
was correlated with most forms of racial disadvantage in the past, its
presence was never necessary to bring systemic racism into existence.11
Indeed, systemic racism has always been less about racial intent than
racial impact.12 It has been about the proverbial white knee on the proverbial
black neck. Animus is simply not a precondition for systemic racism.
Systemic racism in post-Jim Crow America is, for the most part, racial
disadvantage that nonracists practice or tacitly support.13
In this Article, I engage systemic racism in two ways. First, I discuss
some of its current manifestations, Part II. In particular, I will offer
powerful examples of systemic racism, Section A, and explain the link
between slavery and extant systemic racism, Section B. Next, I analyze
the forces in this country that sustain systemic racism well into the postcivil rights period, Part III. I will spend a fair amount of time examining
socio-psychological paradigms and institutional practices or policies that
7. For a discussion of the poker game allegory, see infra text accompanying notes
27–30.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 27–30.
9. See, e.g., C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 7 (2002);
DAVID K. FREMON, THE JIM CROW LAWS AND RACISM IN AMERICAN HISTORY 28 (2000).
10. Compare supra text accompanying note 9, with infra Part II.A.
11. Hence, Vice President Harris’s distinction between “racism” and “systemic
racism” makes perfect sense. See supra note 3.
12. Systemic racism “does not require an ideology to sustain it so long as it was
taken for granted.” GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE ARROGANCE OF RACE: HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON SLAVERY, RACISM, AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY 202 (1988).
13. See, e.g., EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND
RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 26 (2d ed.
2006) (challenging the innocence of color-blind thinking). See also supra note 3 for a
relevant discussion involving Vice President Harris.
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perpetuate or contribute to manifestations of systemic racism. The former
consists of various forms of racial bias, Section A, and the latter focuses
on a few significant legal institutions, Section B. The question of what to
do about systemic racism is important. I do not, however, have enough
space to address that question here.14
II. POST-CIVIL RIGHTS MANIFESTATIONS OF SYSTEMIC RACISM
Systemic racism in post-Jim Crow America appears as capital deficiencies
within African American communities throughout the country.15 These
capital deficiencies do not exist in a vacuum. They are liked to prior systems
of racial oppression, especially slavery.
A. Capital Deficiencies
African American communities are burdened by the weight of capital
deficiencies—financial (e.g., income and property); 16 human (mainly
14. Briefly, the answer lies in reparations and other forms of redressing slavery.
See, e.g., BROOKS, supra note 1, at ix–x (arguing that the United States government should
apologize and provide reparations for slavery). Professor Steven Rogers, an African
American, suggests that the answer to a large extent lies in the hands of white Americans.
Focusing on the racial wealth gap, see infra note 16, he argues that whites can help close
this gap individually by making deposits to black-owned banks, which provide mortgages
to black families, by purchasing goods and services from black businesses, which
collectively are the largest private employers of African Americans—the federal
government being the largest public employer—and by donating money to one or more of
the 101 Historically Black Colleges and Universities, HBCUs, which, despite comprising
only 3% of the colleges or universities in the country, “have produced one U.S. vice
president, 80% of Black judges, 50% of Black lawyers, 50% of Black doctors, 40% of
Black engineers, 40% of the Black members of Congress, and 13% of the Black CEOs in
America today.” STEVEN S. ROGERS, A LETTER TO MY WHITE FRIENDS AND COLLEAGUES:
WHAT YOU CAN DO RIGHT NOW TO HELP THE BLACK COMMUNITY 90, 109, 117–18 (2021).
Professor Rogers supports cash reparations in an amount equal to the racial gap in net
family wealth paid. See id. at 184. This amount calculated for the approximately twenty
million descendants of the enslaved is about $3 trillion. Id. (calculating the racial wealth
gap at $153,000, which is similar to what is reported in supra note 16). Professor Rogers
points out that this amount “is less than the 2008 bank bailouts, which amounted to more
than $4 trillion.” Id.
15. See, e.g., BROOKS, supra note 2, at 125–82 (statistical analysis of racial
demographics); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF
AFRICAN AMERICANS (1948).
16. For example, “[a]t $171,000, the net worth of a typical white family is nearly
ten times greater than that of a Black family ($17,150) in 2016. Gaps in wealth between
Black and white households reveal the effects of accumulated inequality and discrimination,
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formal skills and education);17 and social (the ability to get things done in
society).18 These deficiencies give evidence of embedded racial disadvantage;
built-in disadvantages for blacks, built-in advantages for whites. That’s
systemic racism. Current examples of systemic racism include the following:


Unconscionable racial disparity in net family wealth—white
wealth is ten times greater than black wealth—caused in large
part by government housing policies. Begun during slavery,
these policies were retooled in the 1950s and 1960s to deny
post-World War II African Americans homeownership and,
hence, the opportunity to create intergenerational wealth.19

as well as differences in power and opportunity that can be traced back to this nation’s
inception.” Kriston McIntosh et al., Examining the Black-White Wealth Gap, BROOKINGS
(Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/02/27/examining-theblack-white-wealth-gap/ [https://perma.cc/33WA-XNAT].
17. For example, Michael Gee notes that there has been “very little progress in minority
executive employment. It seems the national conversation and media focus on the subject
have resulted in minimal impact. And yet the ecosystem supporting diversity is quite large
— government agencies, formal corporate diversity programs, universities, consultants,
and dozens of civil rights advocacy groups. . . . In his July 2015 testimony to the EEOC,
Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, a sociology professor at UMass Amherst, commented ‘[t]here
is no evidence that corporate equal opportunity statements are associated with increased
employee diversity.’ In my opinion, EEOC oversight and enforcement of anti-discrimination
laws nationally has also fallen short.” Michael Gee, Why Aren’t Black Employees Getting
More White-Collar Jobs?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 28, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/02/whyarent-black-employees-getting-more-white-collar-jobs [https://perma.cc/XC5P-GRRX].
For a discussion of the college enrollment disparity, see, for example, Postsecondary Education:
College Enrollment Rates, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT. (May 2021), https://nces.ed.gov/
programs/coe/indicator/cpb [https://perma.cc/4Q8C-5TPR] (reporting that, in 2019, the
college enrollment rate for eighteen to twenty-four-year-olds was thirty-seven percent for
blacks and forty-one percent for whites).
18. It cannot be gainsaid that white Americans have an easier time getting by and
getting ahead than black Americans simply because white power and influence within the
social order, “white goodwill,” is considerably greater than black goodwill. See BROOKS,
supra note 2, at 20.
19. See supra note 16 for discussion of the black/white gap in net family wealth.
Steven S. Rogers, retired Harvard Business School professor, explained how the government’s
housing policies helped whites and simultaneously disadvantaged blacks:
After World War II, there was a housing boom in America, fueled by the
Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which was part of the New Deal. At the
time the country had a miniscule middle class. Citizens were either poor or rich.
Suburbia did not exist. Most home mortgages were amortized over five years
with a balloon payment at the end. For the mortgages that existed during the
Depression, almost half were in default. The foreclosure rate was almost 1,000
per day. People primarily lived in cities, but, most significantly, prior to 1934,
20- and 30-year home mortgages did not exist. Therefore, only the wealthy could
afford to own homes.
This dynamic changed for White citizens with the creation of the FHA, which
allowed mortgages to be refinanced and guaranteed for new buyers. Banks could
issue mortgages b ecause the federal government was assuming the risk. The
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Economists estimate that for the vast majority of Americans,
who are not of the likes of billionaires Jeff Bezos or Bill
Gates, “up to 80% of lifetime wealth accumulation results
from gifts from earlier generations, ranging from the down
payment on a home to a bequest by a parent.”20
College educated black men, who have done everything
distractors say African Americans should be doing, have
earned less than their white counterparts during the entire
post-Jim Crow period. In fact, this racial wage is larger today
than it was at the beginning of Jim Crow.21

results were that White banks issued millions of loans to White citizens, helping
them create wealth. However, access to this capital was not available to Black
Americans. In fact, the federal government forbade it.
ROGERS, supra note 14, at 63. The government’s discriminatory housing policies included
the imposition of restrictive covenants on white homeowners, preventing them from
legally selling their homes to blacks, as well as redlining laws, preventing private lenders
from issuing mortgages to black neighborhoods. Id. Richard Rothstein discusses the
current impact of the government’s Jim Crow housing policies:
By the time the federal government decided finally to allow African Americans
into the suburbs, the window of opportunity for an integrated nation had mostly
closed. In 1948, for example, Levittown homes sold for about $8,000, or about
$75,000 in today’s [2016] dollars. Now, properties in Levittown without major
remodeling (i.e., one-bath houses) sell for $350,000 and up. White workingclass families who bought those homes in 1948 have gained, over three
generations, more than $200,000 in wealth.
RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 182 (2017). The fact that the white increase in home
equity, $200,000, approximates the racial gap in net family wealth, $171,000, see supra
note 16, should not go unnoticed. Whether measured by wealth or by income, the racial
gap is huge. See, e.g., Emily Badger, Whites Have Huge Wealth Edge Over Blacks (but
Don’t Know It), N.Y. TIMES : U PSHOT (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2017/09/18/upshot/black-white-wealth-gap-perceptions.html [https://perma.cc/
V4HC-ZUNM] (“Black families in America earn just $57.30 for every $100 in income
earned by white families . . . . For every $100 in white family wealth, black families hold
just $5.04.”).
20. Dalton Conley, The Cost of Slavery, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2003), https://
www.nytimes.com/2003/02/15/opinion/the-cost-of-slavery.html [https://perma.cc/JA3GTSJ3].
21. The wage differential between college educated black and white males of
similar experience is larger today than it was in 1972 even though black males are doing
everything conservatives say blacks should be doing to get ahead. See BROOKS, supra
note 2, at 148 figs. 38 & 39 (displaying disparity in earnings from 1975 to 2003). See also
The Editorial Board, Even College Doesn’t Bridge the Racial Income Gap, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/20/opinion/college-racial-incomegap.html [https://perma.cc/2Y28-3352] (explaining that the wage gap has grown since
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Racial disparity in our criminal justice institutions,
particularly police killings of unarmed African Americans and
disproportionately longer prison sentences.22

1979 and that in 2016 “black college graduates earned about 21 percent less per hour on
average than white college graduates.”). A study using similar data—both male and
female college graduates—published in 2019 reports that “young black college graduates
are paid, on average, 12.2 percent less than their white counterparts.” Elise Gould, Zane
Mokhiber & Julia Wolfe, Class of 2019: College Edition, ECON. POL’Y INST. (May 14,
2019), https://www.epi.org/publication/class-of-2019-college-edition/ [https://perma.cc/
E5SK-VVAZ]. To the extent that these wage disparities are largely due to grades, that
would suggest that the racial gap in the quality of K-12 education has grown since the end
of Jim Crow. Yet grades do not tell the whole story. Two researchers report that though
“a higher proportion of Asians than whites graduate from the top half of law schools” but
“[w]hite law graduates get a median annual boost to earnings . . . that is substantially
higher than minority law grads . . . .” Debra Cassens Weiss, A Law Degree Provides a
Larger Earnings Boost to Whites Than Minorities, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 2, 2017), http://www.
abajournal.com/news/article/a_law_degree_provides_a_larger_earnings_boost_to_whites
_than_minorities_res [https://perma.cc/2RJL-VWKG].
22. The Washington Post has created a database of every known deadly police
shooting in America since 2015. As of May 17, 2021, the paper reports that: “Although
half of the people shot and killed by police are White, Black Americans are shot at a
disproportionate rate. They account for less than 13 percent of the U.S. population, but are
killed by police at more than twice the rate of White Americans. Hispanic Americans are
also killed by police at a disproportionate rate.” Fatal Force, WASH. POST (May 17, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/police-shootings-database/ [https://
perma.cc/FV2R-LD5L]. A major conservative institute misleads it followers by not clearly
differentiating between unarmed and armed killings:
The evidence is clear: Policing in America is not systemically racist. Nearly
every single one of the more than 6k people (of all races) killed by law
enforcement officers in recent years was armed. . . . As of this writing [April 14,
2021], 6,211 people have been shot and killed by law enforcement officers. 46%
of them—2,883 to be exact—were white, while 24% (1,496 total) were black.
Just 6% were unarmed.
Dan O’Donnell, The Truth About Police Shootings in America, MACIVER INST. (Apr. 14,
2021), https://www.maciverinstitute.com/2021/04/the-truth-about-police-shootings-inamerica/ [https://perma.cc/EWS6-5ED4]. Of course, the issue concerns the percentage of
unarmed police killings. This information was readily available in the Washington Post
report. The authors knew that because they explicitly referenced that report. It is sometimes
argued that “a few bad apples” are responsible for police killings of unarmed African
Americans. BEN CRUMP, OPEN SEASON: LEGALIZED GENOCIDE OF COLORED PEOPLE 22
(2019). Even assuming, arguendo, that this is correct, the very fact that bad apples are
allowed to remain in police departments year after year is itself an expression of systemic
racism. Departmental policies protect bad apples at the expense of black lives. Ben
Crump, arguably the leading civil rights lawyer in the country today, has witnessed
systemic racial disadvantage in the criminal justice system firsthand. See id. at 209. He
has represented numerous unarmed black individuals, including George Floyd and Michael
Brown, killed by police officers. Id. In addition to police killings of unarmed black Americans,
Crump points to the fact that African Americans receive disproportionately longer prison
sentences. Id. at 88, 94. Most black encounters with the criminal justice system do not
make headlines, Crump observes. See generally id. at 45, 83. He also notes that these acts
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Voter suppression laws enacted by dozens of states that, as a
federal appeals court said of one of these laws, targets African
Americans “with almost surgical precision.”23

are all committed one person at a time rather than all at once; yet the result is the same—
systemic racism manifested as “racial genocide.” See id. at 8.
23. In N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, the appellate court enjoined
implementation of several voter restrictions enacted in the state’s 2013 Omnibus Law: (1)
the elimination of preregistration; (2) the elimination of out-of-precinct provisional voting;
(3) the elimination of same-day registration; (4) the reduction of the time for early voting;
and (5) the requirement of a photo ID to vote. N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory,
831 F.3d 204, 242 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. North Carolina v. N.C. State
Conf. of the NAACP, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017). In reversing the district court’s judgment,
the appellate court found that each of these restrictions had been enacted with racially
discriminatory intent. Id. at 215. These restrictions “unmistakably” reflected the General
Assembly’s motivation to “entrench itself . . . by targeting voters who, based on race, were
unlikely to vote for the majority party,” id. at 233, and did so with “almost surgical
precision” using the data on voting practices, id. at 214 (emphasis added). Given the
court’s finding of a political motivation behind the restrictions, it could be argued that the
racial aspect of the law involved the law’s effect rather than its intent. Either analysis
leads to the same conclusion; to wit, racial disadvantage occurring not in isolation but as
part of a pattern of such disadvantage in the form of voter suppression. Importantly, the
appellate court noted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570
U.S. 529 (2013), gave license to the state legislature to enact the voter suppression law.
The Court in Shelby County effectively overturned the preclearance provision of the 1965
Voting Rights Act on the ground that the coverage formula Congress used to trigger
preclearance was dated and, hence, “irrational.” Id. at 556. “Things have changed in the
South,” the Court reasoned, “[v]oter turnout and registration rates now approach parity.
Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And minority candidates
hold office at unprecedented levels.” Id. at 540. In dissent, Justice Ginsburg astutely
noted: “Volumes of evidence supported Congress’ determination that the prospect of
retrogression was real. Throwing out preclearance when it has worked and is continuing
to work to stop discriminatory changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm
because you are not getting wet.” Id. at 590 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Indeed, blacks got
soaked after Shelby County. North Carolina is only one of many states that enacted voter
suppression laws following the Court’s decision. As the appellate court noted, the General
Assembly expanded the Omnibus bill’s restrictions and amended the voter ID provision
to exclude “many of the alternative photo IDs used by African Americans,” and retained
“only the kinds of IDs that white North Carolinians were more likely to possess.”
McCrory, 831 F.3d at 216. Shelby County is one of many cases that demonstrate an
uncomfortable truth about the Supreme Court’s decision making in civil rights cases;
namely, it sustains or contributes to systemic racism. See infra note 24 for a discussion of
individual cases which collectively manifest systemic racism. See infra Part III.B for a
discussion of some of the Court’s institutional structures that sustain the Court’s systemic
racism.
The Brennan Center for Justice reports on systemic racism in voting, specifically the
pattern of voter suppression laws that have taken shape just since the 2020 Presidential
Election. “As of May 14, 2021, legislators have introduced 389 bills with restrictive
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The parade of major civil rights defeats at the Supreme
Court, often by split decisions which indicate the outcomes
were not preordained by law.24

provisions in 48 states.” State Voting Bills Tracker, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (May 28,
2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/state-voting-bills-tracker2021 [perma.cc/3UNF-7MS7]. The NAACP LDF reports that, “[t]his concerted effort to
diminish the power of the Black vote came in many forms, including the purging of voter
rolls, mail-in voting requirements, ID laws, rampant misinformation, and direct attempts
to intimidate voters and ballot counters,” according to LDF Associate-Director Counsel
Janai Nelson. LDF Releases Preview of Democracy Defended Report Detailing Voter
Suppression and Intimidation in 2020 General Election, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC.
FUND (Mar. 6, 2021), https://www.naacpldf.org/press-release/ldf-releases-preview-ofdemocracy-defended-report-detailing-voter-suppression-and-intimidation-in-2020-generalelection/ [perma.cc/2XS5-4S5J]. In Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, the
Supreme Court indicated that it was not inclined to overrule voter suppression laws under
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, last remaining substantive provision of the Act after
Shelby County. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2343–44 (2021).
Section 2 provides: “No voting . . . practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by
any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgment of
the right of any citizen . . . to vote on account of race or color.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a).
Ignoring this command, the Court held that a Section 2 violation is only established if the
state’s entire electoral system has a disparate impact on minority voting. Brnovich, 141 S.
Ct. at 2346. Disparate impact can no longer be based on a single voting practice as the
statute commands; it must be based on the entire voting system as the Court commands.
The conservative justices did what they always accuse the liberal justices of doing; they
amended a statute.
24. In addition to Shelby County v. Holder and Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l
Comm., see supra note 23, there are numerous decisions by the Court which, taken
together, constitute a pattern of racial disadvantage. Because of this systemic racism,
African Americans and civil rights scholars look upon the Supreme Court as more foe than
friend. See infra Part III.B. What follows is a sampling of the Court’s decisions. In
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, the Supreme Court disadvantaged African Americans
by denying employees the right to sue for damages caused by racial harassment on the job.
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 189 (1989). The case was decided under
a Reconstruction-Era statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Id. In arriving at its decision, the Court
ruled that the statute, which provides that “[a]ll persons . . . shall have the same right . . .
to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens,” does not apply to
conduct that occurs after the formation of a contract and that does not interfere with the
right to enforce established contract obligations. Id. at 176. In Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio, the Court required the Title VII plaintiff to identify the particular employment
policy or practice that produced the alleged disparate impact regardless of whether such a
policy or practice could be isolated in that manner. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989). In addition, the Court placed the burden of persuasion on the
plaintiff to disprove the employer’s assertion of its business necessity defense. See id. at
671. Congress overturned these decisions when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. In Martin v. Wilks, the
Court permitted white firefighters who had not been parties to the litigation—establishing
a consent decree governing hiring and promotion of black firefighters in the Birmingham,
Alabama, Fire Department—to bring a lawsuit to collaterally attack the decree even
though the white firefighters should have known about the decree or were adequately
represented by the original parties. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 764 (1989). Grove
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City College v. Bell limited the meaning of “program or activity” for purposes of liability
under Title XI, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, and, by extension, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–2000d-7. Grove City Coll. V. Bell, 265 U.S. 555, 574 (1984).
Again, Congress responded by passing corrective legislation, enacting 29 U.S.C. section
794(b) to overturn the decision. Milliken v. Bradley significantly limits the use of
metropolitan desegregation plans to integrate highly segregated inner-city schools.
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 754 (1974). This case, along with Board of Education
v. Dowell and Freeman v. Pitts, both of which allow school districts that have not achieved
full unitary status to stop trying, are considered by many civil rights scholars to be tragic
decisions for racial progress. See Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249 (1991);
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 491 (1992). These decisions will allow schools to remain
segregated and unequal well into the future. Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke limits racial integration through college admissions. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 265 (1978). Shaw v. Reno, Shelby County v. Holder, and Alabama
Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama make it more difficult to establish effective political
representation for blacks in states with a history of restricting black voting rights. See
generally Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612
(2013); Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015). These cases
have given a green light to states to pass voter suppression laws. See supra note 20
(discussing Shelby County). Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co. and Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena made it difficult for cities to require its contractors to award subcontracts to
black businesses. See generally Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins
III) denied the federal courts the authority, absent a showing of segregative intent, to order
the state to fund higher teacher salaries to attract better teachers to inner-city schools.
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995). United States v. Fordice threatened the
existence of HBCUs, prompting Justice Thomas to write separately, “there exists ‘sound
educational justification’ for maintaining historically black colleges as such.” United
States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 748 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring). Gratz v. Bollinger
overturned an admission process designed to increase the number of black and Latinx
students at a prestigious university. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275–76 (2003). But
Grutter v. Bollinger, decided the same day, approved an admission process designed to
increase the number of black and Latinx students at a prestigious law school. Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District Number 1 squashed integration efforts in de facto segregated school
districts. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 701
(2007). Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigration
Rights and Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary required blacks to engage in the
arduous process of amending the state constitution to implement state affirmative action
programs. Schuette v. Coal. to Def. Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigr. Rts. &
Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary, 572 U.S. 291, 312–14 (2014). Outside of
ending slavery and Jim Crow, African Americans made the most racial progress during
the heyday of affirmative action, the mid-1970s. See BROOKS, supra note 2, at 144–51
figs. 30–45, 157–59 figs. 55–60 (showing disparity in earnings and college participation).
Again, this is just a sampling of the Court’s inglorious decisions. For further discussion,
see generally ROY L. BROOKS, GILBERT PAUL CARRASCO & MICHAEL SELMI, THE LAW OF
DISCRIMINATION: CASES AND PERSPECTIVES 3–25, 480 (2011).
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 The record of “deep-rooted racism in the military.”25
 The denial of equal educational opportunity when racist
teachers, whose victims are unlikely to attend office hours or
take advantage of other educational opportunities associated
with the teacher, are protected by academic freedom.26
B. Link to Slavery
Systemic racism is not only omnipresent, embedded, and racially
debilitating, it is also linked to slavery and Jim Crow. It is, indeed,
a lingering effect of slavery, one of the vestiges, badges, or incidents of
slavery. I have often used an allegory of a poker game to visualize the
lingering effects of slavery:
Two persons—one white, the other black—are playing a game of poker.
The game has been in progress for almost four hundred years. One player—the
white one—has been cheating during much of this time, but now announces:
‘From this day forward, there will be a new game with new players and no more
cheating.’ Hopeful but somewhat suspicious, the black player responds, ‘That’s
great. I’ve been waiting to hear you say that for some four hundred years. Let
me ask you, what are you going to do with all those poker chips that you have
stacked up on your side of the table all these years?’ ‘Well,’ says the white player,
somewhat bewildered by the question, ‘I’m going to keep them for the next
generation of white players, of course.’27

25. “[C]urrent and former enlistees and officers in nearly every branch of the armed
services described a deep-rooted culture of racism and discrimination [from white
subordinates who fail to salute black superiors to hate crimes] that stubbornly festers,
despite repeated efforts to eradicate it.” Kat Stafford et al., Deep-Rooted Racism,
Discrimination Permeate U.S. Military, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. (May 27, 2021, 5:03
PM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/nation-world/story/2021-05-26/ deeprooted-racism-discrimination-permeate-us-military [perma.cc/ZL5D-3WUS].
26. The institution is not off the hook if the teacher targets all students, black and
white; in other words, if the teacher is an equal opportunity offender. The teacher’s rants
adversely affect black students more than white students because black and white Americans
are not at equal risk in our society. “Even blacks who have ‘made it’ . . . have a sense that
they are not equal in social status in spite of their socioeconomic success and the election
and reelection of a black president.” BROOKS, supra note 3, at 6.
27. BROOKS, supra note 2, at 10. I used this allegory as a law student at Yale—no
doubt not the first person to do so—and employed it in an early civil rights casebook with
a slightly different ending in which the black player responds, “[s]o, whites will continue
to benefit from past cheating; that’s not fair.” See BROOKS, CARRASCO & MARTIN, supra
note 24, at 3. Similarly, Professor Steven Rogers argues that practices denying blacks
full participation in wealth creation began during slavery and continued thereafter with
the enactment of the Black Codes, racially oppressive laws aimed at keeping blacks in a
state of slavery and a source of cheap labor, and with discriminatory housing polices
enacted in the mid-twentieth century. See ROGERS, supra note 14, at 53–69. The private
sector colluded with the government to achieve this racial outcome. See id.
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Systemic racism—capital deficiencies in black communities—is rooted
in slavery. However, for hundreds of thousands of African Americans,
slavery ended not in 1865 but sometime after World War II, into the
1950s.28 This is within the lifetime of many Americans today. In total,
about 800,000 African Americans were forced into involuntary servitude
under convict leasing, debt bondage, and other state or municipal laws,
often dying before their sentences could be completed.29 These African
Americans were convicted on such trumped-up charges as burglary or
grand larceny, or on even more minor charges such as vagrancy. For
example, “Black men and women were arrested and found guilty of vagrancies
violations for not having jobs, for being unable to show documents
proving that they were employed, or for ‘having jobs that did not serve
the interest of whites. . . . [V]agrancy laws exploited Black adults and
their children.’”30
This form of slavery was outlawed in 1941 when the United States
Attorney General signed an order called Circular No. 3591, which for the
first time created federal law enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment’s
prohibition against involuntary servitude.31 The Attorney General signed
the directive on December 12, 1941, just five days after the bombing of
Pearl Harbor.32 But it took time for the government to enforce the new
law. So, for many blacks, slavery did not end until years after World War
II. Born into this system of “slavery by another name,” Ben Jobe reports:

28. Kathy Roberts Forde & Bryan Bowman, Exploiting Black Labor After the Abolition
of Slavery, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 7, 2017, 11:18 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/nationalnews/articles/2017-02-07/exploiting-black-labor-after-the-abolition-of-slavery [https://perma.
cc/7M74-ZXXQ].
29. See Douglas Blackmon on Slavery by Another Name, BILL MOYERS J. (June 20,
2008), http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/06202008/watch2.html [https://perma.cc/
M2TZ-KHS3]; see also DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE REENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (1st ed.
2009). “As many as 200,000 black Americans were forced into back-breaking labor in
coal mines, turpentine factories and lumber camps [alone]. They lived in squalid conditions,
chained, starved, beaten, flogged and sexually violated. They died by the thousands from
injury, disease and torture.” Forde & Bowman, supra note 28. “In some Alabama prison
camps, convicts died at a rate of 30–40% a year.” SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME (PBS
2012).
30. ROGERS, supra note 14, at 61–62.
31. See N ANCY O’B RIEN WAGNER , S LAVERY BY ANOTHER N AME H ISTORY
BACKGROUND 1, 6 (2012).
32. See BLACKMON, supra note 29, at 377–78.

779

BROOKS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

12/15/2021 9:58 AM

When we came off the plantation, 1945, I was around 11 years old. . . . [S]lavery
ended in 1945, let me make that clear. Most people think it was 1865. Oh no, [it
was] 1945, when the federal government finally put some teeth into [Circular No.
3591] . . . and arrested some of the slave owners.33

In short, the manifestations of systemic racism that we see in our
country today—capital deficiencies in African American communities—
began during slavery, whether ending in 1865 or sometime after 1945.
They are, thereby, linked to slavery. The question then becomes: what
sustains systemic racism today, long after slavery? In answering that question,
slavery, once again, presents itself.
III. POST-CIVIL RIGHTS FORCES SUSTAINING SYSTEMIC RACISM
Socio-psychological paradigms and institutional practices or policies
sustain or even engender systemic racism in our post-civil rights society.
Section A in this part of the Article focuses on socio-psychological (sociopsychological racism) and Section B on institutional (institutional racism)
patterns that sustain systemic racism post-Jim Crow. Section B is limited
to legal institutions; in particular, textualism, an important legal theory,
and, more generally, the Supreme Court’s decision-making in civil rights
cases. As to the latter, I will limit my analysis to the Court’s protection
of private acts of racial discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment
and to its dogged adherence to the color-blind norm notwithstanding the
degree of racial disadvantage it visits upon African Americans.
A. Socio-psychological Racism
Socio-psychological racism derives from what can be called “the
psychology of slavery,” by which I mean the “attitudes associated with
racist rhetoric used to justify the peculiar institution.”34 These mindsets
are among the lingering effects of slavery. But for slavery they would not
have such a pervasive presence in Twenty-First Century America. These
mindsets sustain behavior or conditions that steadily and chronically
disadvantage African Americans. Overt forms of racism—racial antipathy
and the belief in white supremacy, both often referred to as old fashioned
33. JACKIE MACMULLAN, RAFE BARTHOLOMEW & DAN KLORES, BASKETBALL: A
LOVE STORY 133 (2018). See also BLACKMON, supra note 29, at 377–82 (discussing
enforcement of Circular No. 3591 by Attorney General Francis Biddle). Biddle, who held
racist views of blacks in line with his contemporaries, was no hero. He was simply doing
his duty, which was to enforce the compact of freedom forged in the Civil War. “Congress
passed even more explicit statutes, making any form of slavery in the United States
indisputably a crime. Reports of involuntary servitude continued to trickle in to federal
investigators well into the 1950s.” Id. at 381.
34. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 37.
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racism—are certainly among the menacing mindsets. So too are covert
forms of racism—insider or white privilege and implicit bias. Covert
forms of racism are less motivational than cognitive and, therefore, are
more difficult for the person harboring these mindsets to detect.
1. Old-Fashioned Racism
Recently, a white male in his early thirties chatted with me about his
family. He grew up in a family that espoused a strong belief in black
inferiority. His family was not alone. His father, mother, aunts, and
uncles were among about one hundred other families living in San Diego
and Los Angeles who taught their children that African Americans were
inferior. Operating from this racial mindset, these families, who associated
with one another on a regular basis, mistreated African Americans in the
small businesses that most of these families operated. They typically
overcharged black customers for goods and services and provided poor
quality goods and services. Interestingly, the same treatment was not
accorded to Latinx and Asian customers, perhaps because they are closer
to the white phenotype.35
Racial antipathy and white supremacy are not relics of a bygone era.
What Justice William O. Douglas observed as the country was moving
into the post-civil rights period rings true today well into the post-Jim
Crow period: “While the institution has been outlawed, [slavery] has
remained in the minds and hearts of many white men. Cases which have
come to this Court depict a spectacle of slavery unwilling to die.”36 Max
Boot, an award-winning columnist, observed that, “GOP state legislators
around the country have praised the constitutional provision that enslaved
people would count as only three-fifths of a person in determining congressional
representation.”37 Similarly, I have noted racism’s presence within the
white-working-class culture:

35. This conversation took place on May 21, 2021, in San Diego. The young man
worked in the family business and was trying to find a way to extricate himself from both
the family and its business. He agreed to allow me to mention the contours of his story so
long as I did not mention him or his family by name.
36. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 445 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring).
37. Max Boot, Opinion: Think Republicans in Washington Are Bad? They’re Far
Worse at the State Level, WASH. P OST (May 10, 2021, 12:34 PM), https://www.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/05/10/republicans-worse-state-level/
[https://perma.cc/6GBU-JALS].
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Nearly 20 percent of those who voted for Donald Trump in the 2016 South
Carolina Republican primary, mostly working-class whites, believed ending
slavery was a mistake. No wonder. Many working-class whites believe blacks are
lazy, ‘welfare cheats’ and responsible for an unspecified amount of the economic
misfortunes of the white working class.38

Racist individuals can engender or sustain systemic racism in at least
two ways. The first is by poisoning the social environment with odious
opinions about African Americans.39 These views shape the ways in which
blacks are treated by others. They collectively create a toxic environment
which makes it more difficult for blacks than for whites to move through
life and to get things done. This environment diminishes the power and
influence black Americans are able to exercise within the social order. It
undermines black goodwill, the group’s ability to get by or get ahead in
life; in other words, their social capital. Racism, in short, imposes a social
burden on blacks—a black tax—that whites simply do not have to shoulder.
The second way in which racial antipathy or white supremacy perpetuates
or generates systemic racial disadvantage for African Americans is
through the influence powerful individuals who hold these views exert on
the ways in which their organizations operate.40 Unchecked, these “bad
apples” effectively turn a personal belief system into institutional policy.
Thus, the “good apples” may be the numerical majority, but, in the absence
of effective resistance, the “bad apples” exercise effective control over the
organization. One does not have to go back to the days of Jim Crow when
the KKK influenced local law enforcement in the South to find examples.
A recent one is the FBI’s arrest of Deputy Cody Griggers of the Wilkinson
County, Georgia sheriff’s department. This deputy sheriff was “a group
member who rationalized violence with rhetoric steeped in White supremacist

38. BROOKS, supra note 3, at 92–93. I also noted the following:
Given these views, it is not surprising that the white working class tends to view
affirmative action as an unfair practice that takes jobs away from deserving
white men. Curiously, if a working-class white receives or has received some
form of special assistance, whether private (for example, nepotism or union
legacy) or public (for example, food stamps, assisted-living allowance, or disability),
this is seen as deserving rather than freeloading. A study in 2014 revealed
“rampant nepotism” in the Los Angeles County Fire Department despite its
antinepotism policy. The working-class view of affirmative action is actually
complex. Although many working-class whites complain about the unfairness
of affirmative action, they do recognize situations in which it is acceptable. For
example, “women should be privileged for certain jobs dealing with women and
children, and blacks and Hispanics should be privileged in jobs dealing with
crime.”
Id. at 93.
39. See supra Part III.A.1.
40. See infra Part III.B.
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and far-right ideology.”41 White supremacy is on the rise and spreading
in our society.42
2. Insider or White Privilege
In addition to widespread racial antipathy or white supremacy, systemic
racism—embedded patterns of racial disadvantage linked to slavery—can
also be sustained or generated by insider, or white, privilege. This
perpetuation of systemic racism, unlike racial antipathy or white supremacy,
is not necessarily motivational. In fact, animus is not normally associated
with insider privilege. As Robert C. Smith suggests, insider privilege
is “an implicit sense of group position.”43 This mindset has a racially
discriminatory impact. When individuals trade upon their insider privilege
they often sustain racial disadvantage. There is no reason to believe that
whites do not constantly trade on their privilege because, as Smith informs
us, this is an implicit rather than explicit cognitive state.
Other scholars have also crystallized the concept of white privilege.
Peggy McIntosh writes in a famous passage:
I have come to see white privilege as an invisible package of unearned assets
which I can count on cashing in each day, but about which I was ‘meant’ to remain
oblivious. White privilege is like an invisible weightless knapsack of special

41. Andrew Dyer & Kristina Davis, FBI: A San Diego Man’s Phone Leads to
Extremist Group and Georgia Sheriff’s Deputy, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. (Apr. 30, 2021,
3:38 PM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/courts/story/2021-04-30/fbi-sandiego-man-extremist-georgia [https://perma.cc/N5C4-8EHF].
42. See, e.g., Rashawn Ray, What the Capitol Insurgency Reveals About White
Supremacy and Law Enforcement, BROOKINGS (Jan. 12, 2021), www.brookings.edu/blog/
how-we-rise/2021/01/12/what-the-capitol-insurgency-reveals-about-white-supremacyand-law-enforcement/ [https://perma.cc/97FA-55MT]; Carlie Porterfield, White Supremacist
Terrorism ‘On The Rise and Spreading,’ F ORBES (June 25, 2020, 5:00 PM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/carlieporterfield/2020/06/25/white-supremacist-terrorism-on-therise-and-spreading/ [https://perma.cc/24NU-KKHY]; Katanga Johnson & Jim Urquhart,
White Nationalism Upsurge in U.S. Echoes Historical Pattern, Say Scholars, REUTERS
(Sept. 4, 2020, 12:09 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-race-usa-extremismanalysis/white-nationalism-upsurge-in-u-s-echoes-historical-pattern-say-scholars-idUSK
BN25V2QH [https://perma.cc/TM25-S2NW].
43. ROBERT C. SMITH, RACISM IN THE POST-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 42 (1995) (emphasis
added). See Mary R. Jackman & Marie Crane, “Some of My Best Friends Are Black. . .”:
Interracial Friendship and Whites’ Racial Attitudes, 50 PUB. OP. Q. 459, 481 (1986).
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provisions, assurances, tools, maps, guides, codebooks, passports, visas, clothes,
compass, emergency gear, and blank checks. 44

Cheryl Harris suggests that insider privilege operates in our culture as a
property value premised on the right to exclude.45 Most instructive, Robert
Jensen candidly describes insider privilege from an insider’s view:
[W]hen I seek admission to a university, apply for a job, or hunt for an apartment,
I don’t look threatening. Almost all of the people evaluating me for those things
look like me—they are white. They see in me a reflection of themselves—
and in a racist world that is an advantage. I smile. I am white. I am one of them. I
am not dangerous. Even when I voice critical opinions, I am cut some slack.
After all, I’m white.46

One of the most impressive discussions of insider privilege appears in
Stephanie M. Wildman’s book, Privilege Revealed — How Invisible
Preference Undermines America. Wildman uses an interesting example,
slightly modified here, to help us see the privileged identities that can
produce societal disadvantage in America. Let us assume a newspaper
runs three headlines: (1) “Woman Elected Mayor”; (2) “Black Elected
Tax Assessor”; and (3) “Family of 4 Wins Trip to Disneyland.” Reading
these headlines, the average American, whether insider or outsider, would
assume that the new mayor was white, the new tax assessor was male, and
the lucky family was binary. “In each case we are demonstrating ingrained
awareness of the norms that frame our perceptions.” 47 In each case, an
invisible yet unmistakable preference is revealed. There is a default
mechanism, Wildman argues, through which society categorizes our
conceptual tools—words and ideas. Images are formed in our mind’s eye,
difficult to erase, favor some and disfavor others. Those within the circle
of privilege—whites, males, and heterosexuals—have a distinct social
advantage over those who are not. Being within the circle sustains one’s
privilege. Most people, however, live at the intersection of privilege and
subordination, Wildman suggests.48 White women are privileged relative
to African American women, but not with respect to white men.49 White

44. Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of
Coming to See Correspondences Through Work in Women’s Studies 2 (Wellesley Ctrs. for
Women, Working Paper No. 189, 1988) (emphasis added).
45. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1736–37
(1993).
46. Robert Jensen, White Privilege Shapes the U.S., in WHITE PRIVILEGE: ESSENTIAL
READINGS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF RACISM 116 (Paula S. Rothenberg ed., 2d ed. 2005).
47. K ATHLEEN H ALL J AMIESON , B EYOND THE D OUBLE B IND : W OMEN AND
LEADERSHIP 169 (1995). See STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE
PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 80, 126–27 (1996).
48. See WILDMAN, supra note 47, at 21–22.
49. See id. at 22.
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homosexual men are privileged in relation to African American heterosexual
men (particularly when the former choose to hide their sexual orientation)
but not when situated against white heterosexual men (again, particularly
if they choose not to hide their sexual orientation). 50 The circle of
privilege sustains or can even create privilege.
3. Implicit/Unconscious Bias
Implicit bias reflects the way one looks at the world and how one
organizes the social environment in which we all live. It consists of
mental shortcuts or schema people naturally employ to make sense of the
world. Implicit bias occurs when, for example, a supervisor, who does
not consciously think about race when making an employment decision,
operates on the basis of certain “gut feelings,” such as a belief that the white
candidate would “fit in more comfortably” than the black candidate.51 The
Implicit Association Test, IAT, measures implicit bias.
A large and diverse group of Americans have taken the IAT. The test
asks individuals to associate “black” and “white” with “pleasant” or
“unpleasant” words and pictures.52 Test takers tend to associate “black”
with “unpleasant” and “white” with “pleasant” thus preferring whites
to African Americans.53 As Christine Jolls and Cass Sunstein report:
In fact, implicit bias as measured by the IAT has proven to be extremely
widespread. Most people tend to prefer white to African-American, young to old,
and heterosexual to gay. . . . [Although] the relationship between IAT and
behavior remains an active area of research . . . we know enough to know that
some of the time, those who demonstrate implicit bias also manifest this bias in
various forms of actual behavior.54

Some have argued that the correlation between implicit bias and
discriminatory behavior is weak. “[F]actors other than discrimination can
often explain observed group disparities.”55 In addition, some employment
50. See id. at 17–18, 24.
51. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 969, 970 (2006).
52. Id. at 971.
53. Id.
54. Id. See generally MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING
WITHOUT THINKING (2005) (defining the adaptive unconscious as a part of the brain that
leaps to conclusions and makes quick judgements based off of little information).
55. Amy L. Wax, The Discriminating Mind: Define It, Prove It, 40 CONN. L. REV.
979, 1022 (2008). “Many behaviors attributed to unconscious bias could just as well be
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defense lawyers argue “that stereotypes come into play primarily in
interactions among strangers. When a supervisor has known an employee
for months or years, ‘individuating information’ takes over, allowing the
manager to base decisions on specific traits he has come to know, not
implicit assumptions.”56
In contrast, other experts see a clear causal relationship between implicit
bias and discriminatory behavior. For example, William T. Bielby, a
sociology professor and one of the leading expert witnesses for plaintiffs
in implicit bias litigation, has argued that, “‘The tendency to invoke
gender [or racial] stereotypes in making judgments about people is rapid
and automatic. . . . As a result, people are often unaware of how stereotypes
affect their perceptions and behavior,’ including ‘individuals whose
personal beliefs are relatively free of prejudice.’”57
Some argue that structural changes in the workplace that began to
appear in the 1980s have made employment settings ripe for implicit bias.
Prior to the 1980s, job responsibilities and organizational structures were
fairly well defined. Employees typically advanced within the company
through “vertical ladders or pyramids” based on an evaluative process.58
Today, the workplace is “boundaryless.”59 Jobs are less sharply defined,
work is more team-oriented, decision making is less hierarchical, and the
evaluative process is more flexible and subjective, all of which provide
greater opportunities for implicit biases to influence the evaluation of
black and other outsider applicants for employment and promotions.60
Charles Lawrence elaborates on implicit bias in a seminal article on the
subject:
[M]ost of us are unaware of our racism. We do not recognize the ways in which
our cultural experience has influenced our beliefs about race or the occasions on
which those beliefs affect our actions. In other words, a large part of the behavior
that produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation.
There are two explanations for the unconscious nature of our racially
discriminatory beliefs and ideas. First, Freudian theory states that the human mind
defends itself against the discomfort of guilt by denying or refusing to recognize
explained by old-fashioned ‘rational’ or ‘statistical’ discrimination. Such forms of
discrimination are nothing new. . . .” Id.
56. Michael Orey, White Men Can’t Help It: Courts Have Been Buying the Idea
That They Have Innate Biases, BUSINESSWEEK, May 15, 2006, at 54, 57.
57. Id. at 54–57.
58. Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 100 (2003).
59. See id. at 101.
60. Id. at 101, 104–08. See KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS:
EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 165–68 (2004); Rebecca
Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimination in
Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495, 530 (2001).
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those ideas, wishes, and beliefs that conflict with what the individual has learned
is good or right. While our historical experience has made racism an integral part
of our culture, our society has more recently embraced an ideal that rejects racism
as immoral. When an individual experiences conflict between racist ideas and the
societal ethic that condemns those ideas, the mind excludes his racism from
consciousness.
Second, the theory of cognitive psychology states that the culture—including,
for example, the media and an individual’s parents, peers, and authority figures—
transmits certain beliefs and preferences. Because these beliefs are so much a part
of the culture, they are not experienced as explicit lessons. Instead, they seem part
of the individual’s rational ordering of her perceptions of the world. The
individual is unaware, for example, that the ubiquitous presence of a cultural
stereotype has influenced her perception that blacks are lazy or unintelligent.
Because racism is so deeply ingrained in our culture, it is likely to be transmitted
by tacit understandings: Even if a child is not told that blacks are inferior, he
learns that lesson by observing the behavior of others. These tacit understandings,
because they have never been articulated, are less likely to be experienced at a
conscious level.61

The Freudian theme in Lawrence’s article is consistent with the
“aversive racism” thesis presented years ago in a seminal work written by
Joel Kovel, White Racism: A Psychohistory. The “aversive racism” thesis
states that consciously held egalitarian norms often stand in conflict with
unacknowledged racial bias.62 Whites express this conflict when around
racial minorities, not by open hostility, but by anxiety and discomfort.63
Linda Hamilton Krieger points to groundbreaking research that
underscores the cognitive, non-motivational nature of implicit bias. 64
Racial stereotyping is simply a method of categorizing our sensory
perceptions, similar in structure and function to categorizing trees, rocks,
and other natural objects. Racial stereotypes, then, are “cognitive mechanisms”
that all people, “not just ‘prejudiced’ ones, use to simplify the task of
perceiving, processing, and retaining information about people in memory.”65
These biases, Krieger continues, are “unintentional.”66 They “sneak up
61. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322–23 (1987).
62. See JOEL KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY 191–208 (1970).
63. See id. at 208. See generally PAUL L. WACHTEL, RACE IN THE MIND OF
AMERICA: BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE BETWEEN BLACKS AND WHITES (1999).
64. See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 1161 (1995).
65. Id. at 1188.
66. See id.
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on” the individual—“distorting bit by bit the data upon which his decision[s]
[are] eventually based”—which is to say they are “cognitive rather than
motivational.”67 Racial stereotypes “operate absent intent to favor or
disfavor members of a particular social group,” they “operate beyond the
reach of [a person’s] self-awareness.”68
The cognitive dimension of unconscious bias can have deadly
consequences for African Americans, especially when dealing with the
police. Before George Floyd, Eric Garner, Trayvon Martin, and other
unarmed blacks murdered by the police, there was the famous case of
Amadou Diallo. In 1999, four Bronx police officers, all of them white,
fired 41 shots at close range at Amadou Diallo, a young African
American, 19 of them finding their target.69 Several bullets hit the bottom
of Diallos’ feet as he lay dying in the doorway. 70 Diallo was killed
because the police officers “saw” a gun in his hand.71 The gun turned out
to be a wallet Diallo was reaching for.72 Why did the police officers “see”
a gun at such close range? Nothing in the personal histories of the police
officers, all relatively inexperienced—which may be why more than half
of the shots missed73—suggests any of them harbored racial hatred. They
were average white men who were “predispos[ed] to look into a black face
and see ‘criminal.’”74 Part of the risks of being an African American in a
society beset by implicit bias is to always be perceived as a suspect, a
threat. “Even black plain-clothes cops have been killed by their white
fellow officers.”75 If one is black, one is likely to fit the profile of a
criminal or one who is up to no good. As the Canadian author Malcolm
Gladwell has said in recounting his experiences with the police and others
in the United States: “That to the cop looking at you in that split second,
or the employer sizing you up as you walk in the door—black is black is
black.”76

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. William Raspberry, Evidence Here That Race Still Matters, SAN DIEGO UNION
TRIB., Mar. 4, 2000, at B8.
70. Dean Meminger, 20 Years Ago: Amadou Diallo Killed by Police in a Hail of 41
Bullets, SPECTRUM NEWS (Feb. 3, 2019, 5:21 PM), https://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/
news/2019/02/03/20-years-ago—amadou-diallo-was-killed-by-police-in-a-hail-of-41-bullets
[https://perma.cc/L3AP-R2HT].
71. Raspberry, supra note 69.
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. BROOKS, supra note 3, at 72 (quoting Malcolm Gladwell).
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B. Institutional Racism
Systemic racism can be perpetuated or generated within institutions as
well as within society writ large. At the institutional level , systemic
racism is not limited to any particular type of institution. It can arise as a
byproduct of any institution’s normal operations with or without the
knowledge of people in charge.77 My focus here is on certain legal institutions;
specifically, conventional legal theory and civil rights decision-making by
the Supreme Court. The two discussions overlap to some extent. Unlike
other legal institutions, such as the criminal justice system,78 legal theory
and civil rights decisions are not often associated with systemic racism.79
Yet far from being racially innocent, there is one major legal theory that
sustains or contributes to no dearth of systemic racism. It is textualism.
More than any other legal theory,80 textualism is fashioned from a “whiteframed perspective.”81 Textualism yields judicial decisions that systematize
77. See supra text accompanying notes 16–26.
78. See supra note 22 & accompanying text.
79. The tax code is another legal institution one might be surprised to find
institutional racism. For example, single-earner households, which are more likely to be
white than black, pay less taxes than households in which both spouses work, which are
more common among black families. Dorothy A. Brown, How the U.S. Tax Code
Privileges White Families, ATLANTIC (Mar. 23, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/
2021/03/us-tax-code-race-marriage-penalty/618339/ [https://perma.cc/67WW-UU8H].
Also, black employees contribute less to their retirement accounts than their white
counterparts because they are supporting other family members more disadvantaged than
them by systemic racism. Stephen Miller, Black Workers Face Health Care and Retirement
Savings Benefits Gaps, SHRM (July 22, 2020), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/
hr-topics/benefits/pages/black-workers-face-health-care-and-retirement-savings-benefitsgaps.aspx [https://perma.cc/5P3X-LHC5]. These disparities impact the accumulation of
intergenerational wealth. Reducing the number of deductions and exclusions, implementing a
progressive tax rate for wealthy individuals, and a lower tax rate for those earning less
than a living wage are some of the suggestions offered to eliminate systemic racism in the
tax code. See generally DOROTHY A. BROWN, THE WHITENESS OF WEALTH: HOW THE TAX
SYSTEM IMPOVERISHES BLACK AMERICANS—AND HOW WE CAN FIX IT (2021).
80. Judicial pragmatism and judicial nominalism are alternative judicial techniques
that generally do not sustain or contribute to systemic racism. The former is the quest for
justice disciplined by what comes before the case—rules and extant policies—and by what
come after the case, i.e., the consequences of the decision, see ROY L. BROOKS,
STRUCTURES OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING FROM LEGAL FORMALISM TO CRITICAL
THEORY 172–74, 183 (2d ed. 2012), and the latter is the quest for justice disciplined only
by the facts of the case. Nominalism is committed to the best results in particular cases,
giving every litigant their day in court. Judicial decision making, therefore, comes down
to the judge’s gut. See id. at 174–83.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 5–7.
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racial disadvantage for African Americans and racial advantage for white
Americans. Even without textualism’s legal hegemony, however, the Supreme
Court’s decisions in major civil rights cases consistently disadvantage
African Americans. Protecting private discrimination under the Fourteenth
Amendment and vindicating the color-blind norm at all costs are some of
the institutional structures the Court uses as the basis for issuing civil rights
decisions that perpetuate embedded racial disadvantage against African
Americans.82 This is not necessarily a question of judicial animus. Again,
in post-civil rights America, animus does not correlate with systemic racism,
either its manifestations or sustaining forces.
1. Textualism
Textualism is a theory of legal interpretation that centers judicial
decision making on the ordinary meaning of authoritative text at the time
of enactment. Extra-textual sources, such as public policies or legislative
intent, are ignored. Only the original meaning of the constitutional text
(originalism) and the public meaning of statutory text are legitimate sources
for judicial interpretation.83
82. There are other mechanisms, the intent test being one of them. “[T]he Supreme
Court since at least 1976 has required plaintiffs in racial equal protection and Fifteenth
Amendment cases to prove that the laws or practices that they allege discrimination against
them were adopted with a discriminatory purpose.” J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND
INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION
317–18 (1999). In a post-Jim Crow world, discriminatory purpose is nearly impossible to
prove. Allowing the plaintiff to establish a rebuttable presumption of liability based on
discriminatory effects would seem to be a more realistic and fair way of rooting out
discrimination in a post-Jim Crow world. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Blind Justice: Why
the Court Refused to Accept Statistical Evidence of Discriminatory Purpose in McCleskey
v. Kemp—and Some Pathways for Change, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1269 (2018) (explaining
that the McClecsky opinion suggested that restricting statistics, so that they may not be
used to prove discriminatory purpose, was done to protect the criminal justice system
against discrimination claims). Yet the Supreme Court has “not held that a law, neutral
on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid
under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one
race than of another.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). Thus, a
classification having a disparate effect, absent a showing of discriminatory purpose, is
subject to review under the lenient, rational-basis standard. Id. at 246–48; Rogers v.
Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 n.5 (1982). For a discussion of the connection between the
intent test and the color-blind norm, see infra text accompanying notes 129–31.
83. See BROOKS, supra note 80, at 61–74. Differences among textualists “develop
when interpretive difficulties arise, such as when the text is ambiguous or when following
the plain meaning of an unambiguous text will lead to an unreasonable outcome. Under
these circumstances, some legal theorists are more textualist than others.” BROOKS, supra
note 80, at 61. It was, in my view, the desire to avoid an unreasonable outcome that
prompted Justice Gorsuch’s “textualist” opinion in Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct.
1731 (2020). This case is discussed next.
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Determining the ordinary meaning of authoritative text can, however,
be quite subjective. This was evident most prominently in Bostock v.
Clayton County.84 In this case, the Supreme Court did the right thing by
extending Title VII protection to LGBTQ employees. Justice Gorsuch, a
textualist and author of the Court’s 6–3 opinion, claimed that his reasoning
was faithful to the text of the statute prohibiting discrimination “on the
basis of sex.”85 But did the public meaning of the word “sex” when the
statute was passed in 1964 include sexual orientation and gender identity?
The dissenting justices, who are also self-proclaimed textualists, saw
Justice Gorsuch’s reasoning as twisted textualism.86 They vehemently
argued that Justice Gorsuch veered off the textualist path, suggesting that
he was acting as a pragmatist.87
Putting aside the indeterminacy of textualism, the point to make is as
follows: textualism’s structural limitations consistently work to the
disadvantage of African Americans and to the advantage of white Americans,
thereby sustaining systemic racism. Nowhere is this more apparent than
in constitutional textualism—originalism. This legal theory was brought
into the mainstream of judicial thinking by the late Justice Scalia.88 Such
is Justice Scalia’s legacy that a law school was named after him, the
Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University, and a majority of
Supreme Court justices—Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh,
Barrett, and, on occasion, Chief Justice Roberts—have championed his
constitutional textualism. Originalism embraces “The Dead Constitution,”
which instructs judges to give constitutional text the meaning it had at the
time the Constitution was first ratified.89 Justice Scalia justified originalism
on the ground that it saves us from the devastations of its opposite
constitutional theory—“The Living Constitution,” which treats the
Constitution as an evolving document.90 Justice Scalia posited that The
Living Constitution threatens the Bill of Rights, an anti-majoritarian
84. See generally Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
85. Id. at 1754.
86. Id. at 1755–56 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 1834 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
87. See supra note 80 for an explanation of judicial pragmatism.
88. See BROOKS, supra note 80, at 61–89. For a more detailed discussion of Scalian
textualism, see generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW (1997); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012); RALPH A. ROSSUM , ANTONIN S CALIA’S
JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND TRADITION (2006).
89. See generally BROOKS, supra note 80, at 61–89.
90. Id. at 71–72.
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prescription, by permitting judges to interpret the Constitution in any way
a majority of them want to.91 What Justice Scalia feared most was that a
“moral reading” of the Constitution would lead to “a reduction of the
rights of individuals,” because the moral precepts of future societies may
not be as “moral” as those of the society that originally conceived of the
Constitution.92 The Living Constitution, in short, threatens individual
liberties as “the record of history refutes the proposition that the evolving
Constitution will invariably enlarge individual rights.”93
Originalism, it should be noted, has been thoroughly debunked as a
theory of constitutional interpretation. Disputing the textualists’ reliance
on the Founders of the Constitution, our most respected historians have
characterized originalism as ahistorical and nontransparent.94 Justice
91. Id.
92. See SCALIA, supra note 88, at 149. Justice Scalia has in fact indulged policy
through his willingness to join in opinions that are self-consciously policy oriented. For
example, Justice Scalia joined the Supreme Court’s opinion in Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis,
upholding a district court’s exercise of federal jurisdiction under the removal statute even
though that court completely disregarded the unambiguous text of the statute. Caterpillar
Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 64 (1996). The Justices were guided in their decision by “a
main theme of the removal scheme devised by Congress,” and, in the end, found these
“themes” of “finality, efficiency, and economy [to be] overwhelming.” Id. at 63. A
reliance on such policy considerations sounds a lot like legislative intent or spirit, which
is an unacceptable source of statutory interpretation under Scalian textualism. SCALIA,
supra note 88, at 16–18.
93. SCALIA, supra note 88, at 43.
94. For example, historian Ron Chernow writes that Hamilton, the chief author of
The Federalist, “wanted the Constitution to be a flexible document.” RON CHERNOW,
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 256 (2004). Hamilton argued that “[t]here ought to be a capacity
to provide for future contingencies.” Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 34 (Alexander
Hamilton)). Similarly, historian Andrew Shankman makes the point that both Hamilton
and Madison, though in different ways, endorsed a flexible Constitution, one that
is organic, not originalist, and changes with the times. See ANDREW SHANKMAN, ORIGINAL
INTENTS: HAMILTON, JEFFERSON, MADISON, AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 5–6 (2018)
[hereinafter ORIGINAL INTENTS]. See also Andrew Shankman, What Would the Founding
Fathers Make of Originalism? Not Much, HIST. NEWS NETWORK (Mar. 19, 2017),
https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/165374 [https://perma.cc/WU2P-K93F]. More broadly,
Shankman argues that, “[w]e should not trust any figure of the twenty first century who
claims that the Constitution had one meaning for its framers that we can decipher. We
should not take seriously the insistence that we can use this alleged original intent to
determine what the founders would think about contemporary issues, and so what we
should think about them.” ORIGINAL INTENTS, supra, at 145. Gordon Wood, perhaps our
preeminent constitutional historian, has sounded the same note. Commenting on Scalia’s
thesis, he states that the consensus among the Founders, “culminating in the decisions of
the Marshall Court,” was to bring:
the higher law of the Constitution within the realm of ordinary law and subject[]
it to the long-standing rules of legal exposition and construction as if it were no
different from a lowly statute. In effect, all the wide-ranging power of explication
and interpretation traditionally wielded by common-law judges over ordinary
statutes in relation to the law could now be applied to the Constitution itself.
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Oliver Wendell Holmes was an early critic of the idea of The Dead
Constitution, which had been around during his day. He rejected originalism
for much of the same reason as today’s historians. Holmes argued that
the Founders:
[C]alled into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen
completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize
or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost
their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. The
case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience, and not
merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago.95

Thus, Holmes rejected the notion that the Constitution was set in stone,
that it was for all times defined by the Founders’ eighteenth-century
perspective and assumptions. The Constitution’s “broad precepts were
the very antithesis of the absolutism that those . . . [who] having a ‘fetishism
of the Constitution’ tried to read into it, hoping to give their political views
the imprimatur of absolute right.” 96 “The Founders had intentionally
created a document that was a framework, not a straitjacket, that would
allow the nation to meet new challenges which the men wise enough
American judges could now construe the all-too-brief words of the Constitution
by the rules of construction that Blackstone had laid down—subject-matter,
intention, context, and reasonableness. . . .
Gordon S. Wood, Commentary on SCALIA, supra note 88, at 49, 62. Thus, “the extraordinary
degree of discretionary power that American judges now wield” is within rather than
outside our country’s tradition, id. at 62, mainly due to the people’s suspicion of state
legislators during and after the Revolutionary War, id. at 51. More recently, judicial
assertiveness was certainly justified to counteract state segregation statutes and the myriad
voter suppression laws being passed by the states. See supra note 23 and accompanying
text. Wood underscores the point that judicial assertiveness falls within the American
tradition of judicial decision making:
[T]hat power is the product of immense changes in our legal and judicial culture
which have occurred over the past two hundred years, and these changes cannot
be easily reversed. [Scalia’s] remedy of textualism in interpretation seems
scarcely commensurate with the severity of the problem and may in fact be no
solution at all. Textualism, as Justice Scalia defines it, appears to me to be as
permissive and as open to arbitrary judicial discretion and expansion as the use
of legislative intent or other interpretative methods, if the text-minded judge is
so inclined.
Wood, supra, at 62–63. This explanation of textualism certainly sheds light on Justice
Gorsuch’s textualism in Bostock v. Clayton County. See supra text accompanying notes
84–87.
95. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
96. STEPHEN BUDIANSKY, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: A LIFE IN WAR, LAW, AND
IDEAS 460 (2019).
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to draft its inspiring words were wise enough to know they could not
possibly foresee.”97
For African Americans, originalism (text frozen in time) is more than a
misreading of constitutional history. It sustains or generates systemic racism.
From the white frame, Justice Scalia’s operating premise may make sense;
but from the black experience it does not because individual liberties have
expanded since the Constitution’s ratification. Society has in fact gotten
better for African Americans. Slavery is gone. That is no small matter if
one is an African American. But in the textualist frame—the insider’s
frame —black lives do not seem to matter much.
Most tellingly, The Dead Constitution insults African Americans. It
does so by prioritizing constitutional meaning taken from a timeframe
during which African Americans were, in the words of the Supreme Court
itself, “considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings.”98 African
Americans are the unheard and unseen in originalism.
Equally telling, The Dead Constitution, with its implicit judicial minimalism,
cannot sustain the Supreme Court’s reasoning in the most important civil
rights case in history, Brown v. Board of Education.99 Overturning every
state school segregation statute, as well as fifty years of its own precedents,
enlarged the Court beyond the constraints imposed by Justice Scalia’s
minimalism. Also, reading the Fourteenth Amendment as a prohibition
against segregation in public education does not demonstrate the degree
of fealty to the Amendment’s original meaning that Justice Scalia’s originalism
seems to require. Surely the Amendment’s framers, the Thirty-ninth
Congress, intended the Amendment to be read in harmony with the thencommon meaning of racial equality; namely, “separate but equal.” Indeed,
Congress made no attempt to desegregate the public schools of Washington,
D.C. These schools, as well as the public schools in the home districts of
virtually every congressman who voted for the Amendment, were segregated
both before and after the Amendment’s passage and ratification.100
97. Id.
98. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404–05 (1857), superseded by
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
99. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
100. The view that Brown cannot be squared with originalism is overwhelmingly
supported by legal scholars, including Jack Balkin, Alexander Bickel, Alfred Avins,
Michael Klarman, Robert Bork, Mark Tushnet, Raoul Berger, Ronald Dworkin, Richard
Kluger, Earl Maltz, Bernard Schwartz, Laurence Tribe, Thomas Grey, Donald Lively,
Richard Posner, David Richards, and “countless others.” For seminal works, see, e.g.,
Steven G. Calabresi & Michael W. Perl, Originalism and Brown v. Board of Education,
2014 MICH. STATE L. REV. 429 (arguing compatibility); Michael J. Klarman, Brown,
Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L.
REV. 1881 (1995) (arguing non-compatibility, the position of most scholars); Michael W.
McConnell, The Originalist Case for Brown v. Board of Education, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
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It is not enough to argue, as some textualists have done, that the Framers’
understanding of racial equality “was completely inconsistent with the
equal protection of the laws they mandated.”101 Quite obviously, neither
Congress nor the average American at the time saw any such inconsistency.
“Separate but equal,” not desegregation nor certainly integration, was the
public understanding of “equality” or “equal protection of the laws”
during the years following the Civil War.102 Otherwise, the Fourteenth
Amendment would never have been proposed let alone ratified. Equally
significant, Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson,
arguing that the Constitution is color blind, would have been the majority
opinion in that case if color blind, and not “separate but equal,” was the
public meaning of the Equal Protection Clause during that time.103 Plessy’s
decision was only a generation removed from the Fourteenth Amendment’s
ratification. Given all we know about the aftermath of the Civil War, it is
ludicrous to suppose that the lawmakers of that era intended, hoped, or
expected that racial mixing, an essential aspect of Brown’s meaning, would
be within the common, or public, meaning ascribed to the Equal Protection
Clause.
A textualist, in short, would be hard pressed to find textual support for
the Supreme Court’s construction of the Equal Protection Clause in Brown
on either originalist or minimalist grounds. Incompatibility with Brown
should, by itself, discredit any judicial theory.104 But for African Americans,
the problem is more than the niceties of judicial legitimacy. It is personal,
POL’Y 457 (1996) (replying to Klarman’s response); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism
and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 V A. L. R EV . 947, 951–52 (1995) (arguing
compatibility) [hereinafter Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions]; Boris I.
Bittker, Interpreting the Constitution: Is the Intent of the Framers Controlling? If Not,
What Is?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 9 (1995) (taking the majority position).
101. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 169 (1990).
102. Segregation was widely practiced in the North as well as in the South during
Reconstruction, 1865–1877. Brown v. Board at Fifty: “With an Even Hand”: A Century
of Racial Segregation, 1849–1950, LIBR. OF CONG., https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/
brown-segregation.html [https://perma.cc/A2WS-8FXQ]. See generally W.E.B. DU BOIS,
BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA (1935).
103. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
104. “Any theory of constitutional interpretation that is incapable of explaining and
justifying Brown is ipso facto so flawed that the theory of interpretation must, therefore,
be invalid.” Calabresi & Perl, supra note 100, at 431. “Such is the moral authority of
Brown that if any particular theory does not produce the conclusion that Brown was
correctly decided, the theory is seriously discredited.” Originalism and the Desegregation
Decisions, supra note 100, at 952.
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potentially a matter of life and death. If a textualist were standing at the
schoolhouse door in 1954, African American children would have been
denied entry and, hence, equal educational opportunity. Even though
most textualists might have believed in their hearts that segregation was
an egregious degradation of black humanity, they would have counseled
its eradication through democratic process. How disingenuous when they
knew that the democratic process was closed to African Americans in the
South, that the process was decidedly undemocratic. For the textualist to
claim that the text “made me do it” is simply to hide the fact that text is
being constructed from a political perspective. This is nothing more than
gaslighting.
2. Civil Rights Decision-Making
Though textualism did not—thankfully—win the day at the Supreme
Court in 1954, it has cast a large shadow over the Court’s decision-making
in civil rights cases since Brown. In case after case, the Court has issued
decisions that disadvantage African Americans.105 Not all of these decisions
flow from textualism, however. Many are based on the Supreme Court’s
blind allegiance to the color-blind norm, the racial omission norm.106 I
will focus on decisions rendered in two areas: the Fourteenth Amendment,
with its protection of private acts of discrimination, and the Court’s
dogged adherence to the color-blind norm. Both processes of decisionmaking have the effect of sustaining or contributing to patterns of racial
disadvantage for African Americans.
a. The Fourteenth Amendment
A large part of the Supreme Court’s decision-making in civil rights
cases today is predicated on a textualist interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment that traces back to the Civil Rights Cases.107 In these cases,
five African American plaintiffs filed separate lawsuits alleging that
certain hotels, theaters, and public transit companies had violated the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 by denying them services or banning them from areas
reserved for whites.108 Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 stated that:
[A]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the
full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and
privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theatres, and other places
of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations established
105.
106.
107.
108.
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by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any
previous condition of servitude.109

Section 2 of the Act imposed a punishment on any person who violated
Section 1. Under Section 2, a person who violated Section 1 of the Civil
Rights Act would have to pay $500 in damages to the injured party, receive
a misdemeanor conviction, and have to pay an additional fine or be given
a minimum of thirty days of imprisonment. 110 The five cases were
consolidated and came to be known by the name, Civil Rights Cases.111
Though the Court invalidated the Civil Rights Act of 1875 under both
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments,112 my focus will be on the
latter which provides in relevant part: “nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 113
Giving the amendment a plain reading, the Supreme Court ruled:
[I]t is clear that the law in question cannot be sustained by any grant of
legislative power made to Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment. That
amendment prohibits the States from denying to any person the equal protection
of the laws, and declares that Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of the amendment. The law in question, without any
reference to adverse State legislation on the subject, declares that all persons shall
be entitled to equal accommodations and privileges of inns, public conveyances,
and places of public amusement, and imposes a penalty upon any individual who
shall deny to any citizen such equal accommodations and privileges. 114

In so holding, the Court protected private acts of discrimination, such as
the broad range of discrimination visited upon the plaintiffs, from prosecution
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Harlan argued in his dissenting opinion that the Court could
have and should have given the amendment a more liberal reading.115 He
argued, specifically, that the Court’s reading of the amendment was
arbitrary and altogether antithetical to the amendment’s design, which was
to protect the rights of African Americans who were singularly vulnerable
109. Id. at 9.
110. Id.
111. The Civil Rights Cases is sometimes known under the first named case, United
States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
112. For the Court’s opinion regarding the Thirteenth Amendment, see The Civil
Rights Cases, at 20–26.
113. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
114. The Civil Rights Cases, at 18–19.
115. Id. at 26.
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to private acts of violence in the aftermath of slavery. 116 In short, the
Court’s textualist reading of the Fourteenth Amendment undercut the
amendment’s soaring promise of racial equality:
The opinion in these cases proceeds, it seems to me, upon grounds entirely too
narrow and artificial. I cannot resist the conclusion that the substance and spirit
of the recent amendments of the Constitution have been sacrificed by a subtle and
ingenious verbal criticism. ‘It is not the words of the law but the internal sense of
it that makes the law: the letter of the law is the body; the sense and reason of the
law is the soul.’117

Taking the meaning of the law from its spirit rather than from its all-toobrief text is certainly within the tradition of the Supreme Court’s interpretative
powers.118 By ignoring the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Supreme Court consigned African Americans to a status of rank oppression,
a condition that continues to play out today as a manifestation of systemic
racism.
Greatness is often arrived at by choosing a game-changing, morallybased path over Gradgrinding blackletter law.119 This is how Thurgood
Marshall was able to present the Supreme Court with an opportunity to
overturn a half-century of blackletter law in Brown v. Board of Education.120
But the initial act of moral courage came less from Marshall than from a
white southern, patrician of a federal judge, Waties Waring. This uncommon
example of moral courage combined with legal acumen warrants an extensive
recounting as it helps one understand systemic racism in textualism and
the decision it wrought in the Civil Rights Cases:
On Friday morning, November 17, 1950, Judge Waties Waring held a
pretrial conference for the pending Clarendon County schools lawsuit. Beyond a
few attorneys and reporters, there was almost no one in the courtroom; it was
merely routine business.

But it would become one of the most important hearings in American
legal history.

116. Id. at 52–53. For an extensive discussion of the degree of violence, intimidation,
and death southerners visited upon African Americans in the years after slavery, see, for
example, RON CHERNOW, GRANT 703–11 (2017).
117. The Civil Rights Cases, at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
118. See supra note 94 for Professor Gordon Wood’s analysis of constitutional
history. See also supra notes 83–93 and accompanying text for legal and historical debunking
of textualism.
119. Gradgrinding refers to a memorable character in a Charles Dickens novel.
Thomas Gradgrind is the notorious head of a school who is obsessively dedicated to the
pursuit of profit. See CHARLES DICKENS, HARD TIMES (1854). “Gradgrind” has taken on
the generic meaning of a person who is hard and only cares about cold facts and data
points.
120. See generally Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
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The stakes in Briggs v. Elliott could be measured by the legal firepower
in the room. Thurgood Marshall and Harold Boulware from the NAACP
represented the plaintiffs, and the defendant school district had hired
Robert Figg – the Democrats’ lawyer in the previous primary lawsuit.
Figg had far more experience in federal court than any Clarendon
County schools attorney. He had also faced Marshall before and known
Waring for years. Recruiting Figg was a smart move by Clarendon County,
possibly a recommendation from state and party officials.
There wasn’t going to be any settlement, so both sides simply launched
into their lists of issues they wanted resolved before the trial. Figg argued
that the lawsuit made false allegations, that the district didn’t provide buses
to any schools; white parents funded transportation for their children.
Marshall complained that inspectors hadn’t been allowed into the Summerton
schools for a third-party comparison. Waring promised a court order forcing
the district to comply.
Just as the hearing appeared to be wrapping up, Marshall mentioned the
goal of Briggs v. Elliott was to prove that segregation in South Carolina
schools was unconstitutional. Waring stopped him immediately. This lawsuit,
the judge said, did no such thing.
“You’ve partially raised the issue,” Waring said, “but can and may do
what has been done so very, very often heretofore: decide a case on equal
facilities — if you can prove what you say you can prove, that the schools
aren’t at all equal. It’s very easy to decide this case on that issue, and not
touch the constitutional issue at all, because it is the general policy of
American courts not to decide a constitutional issue if it can be decided
on some other issue.”
Marshall didn’t back down right away. He argued the lawsuit did, in
fact, raise the question of constitutionality. Again, Waring disagreed.
When the judge dismissively shut him down, Figg later said, Marshall
looked shocked. But that may have been simple courtroom theatrics for
the benefit of the defense — and the press. It’s almost impossible the two
men hadn’t had the exact same conversation before.
***
Waring never admitted to any collusion with Marshall or NAACP
leader Walter White, even in the years after he left the bench. The Fourth
Circuit certainly would have questioned the ethics of abandoning judicial
neutrality and overtly working with one side in a lawsuit filed in his court.
And South Carolina officials most likely would have stormed the federal
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courthouse. But Waring knew he didn’t have much time left, and felt he
was answering a higher calling.
The judge wanted a case that would bury legal segregation forever, and
believed Briggs was that lawsuit. Almost. In order to insulate himself
from later questions or criticism that he’d unfairly advised the plaintiffs,
he laid out his entire strategy from the bench — and in the court record.
If no one complained at the time, and they didn’t, they could hardly protest
later. It played out beautifully. Waring casually told Marshall he could
simply amend his lawsuit to address the constitutionality of segregation.
“Or, better still, what you should do is not to amend, because that’ll
merely complicate the issue,” the judge said. “Dismiss without prejudice,
and bring a brand new suit, alleging that the schools of Clarendon County,
under the South Carolina constitution and statute, are segregated, and that
those statutes are unconstitutional, and that’ll raise the issue for all time
as to whether a state can segregate by race in its schools.”
Marshall questioned Judge Waring about the specifics for a minute, but
like any good lawyer he already knew the answers. He’d been arguing
cases before the U.S. Supreme Court for a decade — he didn’t need a primer.
But it made for great theater leading up to the moment when Marshall
asked if Briggs v. Elliott could be dismissed without prejudice.
Waring granted the motion.
After the hearing, Marshall and Boulware explained the next steps to
reporters outside the courthouse. The NAACP attorneys would rewrite
Briggs and bring a suit to abolish racial segregation in South Carolina
public schools. Marshall said the plaintiffs had yet to be determined,
because he couldn’t speak for Clarendon County parents, but pledged to
file the lawsuit soon.
And with that, Waring finally had the promise of the case he’d always
wanted. Segregation was the root of all evil in America, the judge believed,
and public schools were the place to challenge separate-but-equal laws. If
the schools were integrated, it would strike at the heart of the race problem
and ultimately lead to significant change in society.
“Prejudice doesn’t start when you’re 18 or 21 years old. You’ve got
it then,” Waring later explained. “Prejudice starts when you’re a little kid
and you go to first grade and you’re told that people have to go through
different doors and use different toilets and there’s something wrong with
other people.”
Even before Marshall and Boulware filed the lawsuit, state officials
began to plot new ways to thwart this coming legal challenge. Nearly
everyone in South Carolina realized this was the gathering storm they’d
long dreaded. And they feared the state was destined to lose. That afternoon,
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The Evening Post reported that Thurgood Marshall had promised the first
lawsuit in history “calling for the integration of races in schools.”121
In the wake of the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court decided Heart
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States.122 Though this case does not overrule
the Civil Rights Cases it does protect against certain private acts of racial
discrimination in public places by upholding the constitutionality of Title
II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.123 Title II proscribes private acts of racial
discrimination that occur in places of public accommodations, and does
so not on Fourteenth Amendment grounds but under the Commerce
Clause.124 However, the Court today is unlikely to uphold its decision in
Heart of Atlanta Motel. Statutory textualism is indisposed to upholding
civil rights statutes based on the Commerce Clause.125 Textualism thereby
systematizes racial disadvantage by thwarting congressional attempts to
eradicate racial discrimination in the social order.
It is important to note that there is nothing ineluctable about the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the Civil Rights
Cases. As Justice Harlan pointed out, the Court could have interpreted
the Fourteenth Amendment in a way that was consistent with the amendment’s
underlying civic and moral purpose—racial equality.126 And, as Justice
Gorsuch’s interpretation of Title VII demonstrated,127 the Court may have
to eschew the letter of the law to reach a just result.

121. Brian Hicks, Waring Excerpt 5: In Plain Sight, P OST & COURIER (Sept. 20,
2018), https://www.postandcourier.com/columnists/waring-excerpt-5-in-plain-sight/article_
6bb66a62-a7c0-11e8-92af-b70b85128655.html [https://perma.cc/SUR8-UZ65]. These
lessons were self-taught. Judge Waring and his wife had simply accepted the racial order
in the South for the first sixty years of their lives. It took an earth-shattering event to shake
the judge and his wife out of their racial ignorance and indifference. Years earlier, Judge
Waring presided over a trial in which the jury returned a verdict of not guilty for a police
commander who had gauged out both eyes of a black service man after dragging him from
a bus as he was returning home from the war in Europe. Judge Waring and his wife started
their own personal library of books on the American race problem written not from the
white southern perspective, but from the black perspective.
122. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
123. Id. at 261–62; 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964).
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
125. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (overturning a federal
right of action against gender violence under both the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth
Amendment). The Court struck down in whole or in part dozens of socially progressive
statutes on minimalist grounds. See, e.g., BROOKS, supra note 80, at 59.
126. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
127. See supra text accompanying note 83.
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One might attempt to justify systemic racism sustained by Court’s
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment—the protection of private
discrimination—on privacy grounds. In other words, private racial
discrimination falls within a constitutionally protected zone of privacy.
But the protection of private discrimination seems unworthy of legal
protection when it denies constitutional or statutory protection to victims
of such odious conduct. One might feel different about systemic racism
if its occurrence were justified by an exceedingly important societal reason,
such as national security. 128 Private acts of racial discrimination that
significantly disadvantage African Americans would not seem to satisfy
this standard. If such discrimination did satisfy this standard, that would
only justify systemic racism. It would not deny the fact that textualism,
the legal theory that protects such discrimination, drives systemic racism.
b. Color-Blind Norm
The Supreme Court’s relentless adherence to race-neutral governmental
practices at all costs to racial progress—the color-blind norm129—is well
illustrated in Ricci v. DeStefano.130 This case also demonstrates the Court’s
preference for the intent test over the effects test, which is another juridical
structure that sustains systemic racism.131 So as not to complicate my
analysis, I will focus on the color-blind norm.
Ricci was decided under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.132
The most important employment discrimination law in the land, Title VII
prohibits intentional acts of employment discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, and national origin—called “disparate treatment”133—
as well as policies or practices that are not intended to discriminate but in
fact have a disproportionately adverse effect on protected classes—called
“disparate impact.” 134 Plaintiffs alleged that the city of New Haven,
Connecticut, engaged in intentional racial discrimination when it decided

128. See BROOKS, supra note 3, at 48 (broaching this standard as a limited justification
for non-nefarious laws that impede racial progress (called “racial subordination”)).
129. For a detailed discussion of this norm, see. e.g., BROOKS, supra note 2, at 14–
34; KOUSSER, supra note 82.
130. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
131. See id. at 585. For a further discussion of this point, see supra note 82.
132. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 557; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1964); cf. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs.
v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519 (2015) (stating that disparate impact
liability under the Fair Housing Act is even more restrictive than under Title VII). See
generally BROOKS, CARRASCO & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 480 (distinguishing disparate
impact from disparate treatment). See supra note 24 for relevant discussion.
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to discard the results of written and oral examinations given to its firefighters.135
Although facially neutral, the examination results had a disparate impact
on black firefighters. At the urging of the union, test scores were weighted
sixty percent for the written scores and forty percent for the oral scores.136
No practical, on-the-job examinations were given. The test results would
determine not only which firefighters would be considered for promotions
to the ranks of lieutenant and captain but also in what order over a twoyear period.137
When the results came back, it was discovered that the pass rate for
blacks and Hispanics on both exams was about one-half the pass rate of
whites.138 As a result, all ten persons promoted to the lieutenant position
were white, and of the nine persons promoted to the rank of captain, seven
were white and two were Hispanic.139 None were black. This established
a prima facie case of disparate-impact discrimination under Title VII.140
Though the exam was racially neutral, it had a disproportionately negative
effect on the black candidates.141
In an after-the-fact attempt to redress what even the Supreme Court
admitted were “significant” racial disparities, the New Haven Civil Service

135. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 562–63.
136. Id. at 564.
137. Id. at 561–68.
138. Id. at 612 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
139. Id.
140. Id. After each examination, the New Haven Civil Service Board (CSB), an
unelected body, certifies a ranked list of applicants who passed the test . Id. at 564
(majority opinion). Under the city’s charter, the authority doing the hiring must fill each
vacancy by choosing one candidate from the top three scorers on the list. Id. This is called
the “rule of three.” Id. Of the seventy-seven candidates who completed the lieutenant
examination—forty-three whites, nineteen blacks, and fifteen Hispanics—thirty-four
candidates passed—twenty-five whites, six blacks, and three Hispanics. Id. at 566. Eight
lieutenant positions were vacant at the time of the examination. Id. Based on the rule of
three, “this meant that the top ten candidates were eligible for an immediate promotion to
lieutenant. All ten were white.” Id. “Subsequent vacancies would have allowed at least
three black candidates to be considered for promotion to lieutenant.” Id. Of the forty-one
candidates who completed the captain examination—twenty-five whites, eight blacks, and
eight Hispanics—twenty-two candidates passed—sixteen whites, three blacks, and three
Hispanics. Id. Because seven captain positions were vacant at the time of the examination,
nine candidates were eligible for an immediate promotion—seven whites and two
Hispanics—based on the rule of three. Id. The fact that the city discarded the disparate
test results indicates that it would have not given the test in the first place had it known
about its consequences.
141. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 593.
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Board (CSB) threw out the test results.142 This meant that everyone would
have to retake the examinations. Most of the successful candidates, seven
white and one Hispanic firefighter, filed a lawsuit claiming that the decision
to throw out the test results constituted intentional race-based discrimination,
given the fact that the successful candidates were mainly white and the
unsuccessful candidates were mainly black.143 The city, in defense, argued
that the sole reason it discarded the test results was to avoid disparateimpact liability under Title VII. 144 The issue, as framed by the Court,
in a 5–4 decision written by Justice Kennedy—in which Justices Roberts,
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito joined—was “whether the purpose to avoid
disparate-impact liability excuses what otherwise would be prohibited
disparate-treatment discrimination.”145 The answer according to the Court: it
depends.
The city can discard test results without violating Title VII’s prohibition
against discrimination on race-conscious grounds or disparate treatment,
the Court held, only if it can demonstrate by “a strong basis in evidence”
that using the disparate exam results would cause it to lose a disparateimpact lawsuit brought, in this instance, by the black test takers.146 In
other words, once the exam has been administered, the employer may
discard the exam results on racial grounds only if it can show by “a strong
basis in evidence” that had it not taken the action, it would have been
found liable by a court either on the basis that the disparate impact could
not be justified as a business necessity or that the employer failed to
pursue an equally valid but less discriminatory alternative.147 The Court
found that the city could not satisfy any of these conditions, that there was
no evidence, let alone strong evidence, of either a problem with the
validity of the tests or of the availability of better testing alternatives.148
142. Id. at 574.
143. Id. at 574–75.
144. Id. at 575.
145. Id. at 580. “The racial adverse impact here was significant.” Id. at 586.
146. Id. at 585.
147. Id.
148. Adverse effects by itself only establish a prima facie case of disparate impact
liability under Title VII. Id. at 587. Liability is established only if either “the examinations
were not job related and consistent with business necessity, or if there existed an equally
valid, less discriminatory alternative that served the City’s needs but that the City refused
to adopt.” Id. Justice Kennedy relied on the record as the basis for his ruling that the
examinations were job related and consistent with business necessity. Id. at 577–78. He
provided several reasons in support of his ruling. First, IOS, an Illinois company hired by
the city to develop and administer the exams, devised the written exam “after painstaking
analyses of the captain and lieutenant positions . . . .” Id. at 588. They assembled a pool
of thirty assessors who were from outside Connecticut and possessed superior rank to the
lieutenant and captain positions being tested. Id. at 565. Within this pool of assessors,
they “made sure that minorities were overrepresented.” Id. at 588. Second, IOS test-
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The Court’s decision vindicated the color-blind, or racial omission,
norm. Discarding the test results, as the city did, was a race-conscious act
and, in the opinion of the Court, ipso facto illegal. Some African Americans
would agree with the Court’s conclusion on the limited ground that raceconscious actions place African Americans in a negative light in that they
portray blacks as losers, hapless victims in need of special governmental
solicitude. As Justice Thomas has offered, “[i]nevitably, such programs
engender attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke resentment
among those who believe that they have been wronged by the government’s
use of race.”149 Arguably, the color-blind norm is also behind the Court’s
subordination of disparate-impact discrimination to disparate-treatment
discrimination. The Court seems to regard the intent test to be less of a
fishing expedition for racist motives than the effects test. The subordination
of the effects test reinforces the core belief held by proponents of the
color-blind norm, which appears to be the main reason behind the Court’s
decision in Ricci, that race no longer matters in a post-civil rights society.150

designed the questions by observing lieutenant and captains perform their duties and by
drawing the questions from sources approved by the fire department. Id. Third, Vincent
Lewis, who was the only outside witness that not only had appeared before the CSB but
also had reviewed the exams in any detail and had any firefighting experience, stated that
the “questions were relevant for both exams.” Id. Fourth, Christopher Hornick, who was
the only other witness who had seen any part of the examinations and who was one of
IOS’s competitors, stated that the examinations “appea[r] to be . . . reasonably good” and
“recommended that the CSB certify the results.” Id. Justice Kennedy also found that there
was no strong basis in evidence supporting the contention that an equally valid, less
discriminatory alternative existed. Id. at 589. He ruled that “respondents have produced
no evidence to show that the 60/40 weighting was indeed arbitrary.” Id. Justice Kennedy
acknowledged that other ways to weigh the tests exist but concluded that the record
presented no evidence that different weighing “would be an equally valid way to determine
whether candidates possess the proper mix of job knowledge and situational skills to earn
promotions.” Id. Justice Kennedy also dismissed the respondents’ argument that the city
could have changed its interpretation of the “rule of three” to produce less discriminatory
results. Id. at 590. While it is true that had the city employed a “banding” technique, and
four black and one Hispanic candidate would have become eligible for officer positions,
this technique was not available to the city because, “[h]ad the City reviewed the exam
results and then adopted banding to make the minority test scores appear higher, it would
have violated Title VII’s prohibition of adjusting test results on the basis of race.” Id. An
employer may, however, consider and act to remedy an exam’s potential racial impact
“during the test-design stage,” the majority wrote. Id. at 585.
149. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
150. For further discussion of this core post-civil rights belief, see BROOKS, supra
note 2, at 14–34.
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But clearly, the Court’s decision in the case impedes racial progress
while advantaging white firefighters. The decision impedes the city’s
attempt to integrate the command positions in its fire department. By not
discarding the test results, qualified black firefighters are denied the opportunity
to move up the command structure of the New Haven Fire Department for
at least a two-year period.151 Without more racial integration, the city’s
fire department will continue to look too much like it did during “the days
of undisguised discrimination.”152 This is the sum and substance of the
dissenting opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, a reformist.153
151. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 562.
152. Id. at 609 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). It should be noted that the Court
announced a new legal standard and does not give the city an opportunity to show that it
can satisfy that standard. In other words, the strong-basis-in-evidence standard was
promulgated by the Court for the very first time in this case. Yet the Court did not remand
the case to give the city an opportunity to address the new legal standard. This is bad
judicial form, especially because the Court used the standard against the city. What this
suggests is that the Court was hell-bent on ruling against the city. As a consequence,
blacks were denied employment opportunities. It seems that the Court only wants it one
way, that it wants “just us” rather than justice. Justice Ginsburg makes a similar charge
against the Court. She accused the Court of underestimating New Haven’s legitimate fear
of losing a disparate-treatment suit. See id. at 629–31. Justice Ginsburg further said of
the Court’s reasoning, “[l]ike the chess player who tries to win by sweeping the opponent’s
pieces off the table,” she wrote of the majority opinion, “the court simply shuts from its
sight the formidable obstacles New Haven would have faced.” Id. at 636.
153. Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion also provides technical arguments that
directly challenge the Court’s technical reasoning; i.e., the Court’s belief that the examinations
were a business necessity and that an equally valid and less discriminatory examination
was not available. Justice Ginsburg essentially makes four large points in this regard.
First, she argues that the written examination was insufficient to satisfy the job-related and
business-necessity defense. Id. at 633. “Successful fire officers, the City’s description of
the position makes clear, must have the ‘[a]bility to lead personnel effectively, maintain
discipline, promote harmony, exercise sound judgment, and cooperate with other officials.’ . . .
These qualities are not measured by written tests.” Id. Justice Ginsburg cited numerous
precedents in support of her position: “Courts have long criticized written firefighter
promotion exams for being ‘more probative of the test taker’s ability to recall what a
particular text stated on a given topic than on his firefighting or supervisory knowledge
and abilities.’” Id. (quoting Vulcan Pioneers, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Civ. Serv., 625 F. Supp.
527, 539 (D.N.J. 1985)). “A fire officer’s job, courts have observed, ‘involves complex
behaviors, good interpersonal skills, the ability to make decisions under tremendous
pressure, and a host of other abilitiesnone of which is easily measured by a written,
multiple choice test.’” Id. at 633–34 (quoting Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal. v. St.
Louis, 616 F.2d 350, 359 (8th Cir. 1980)). The argument, therefore, is that a written test,
regardless of whether it is neutrally constructed, is not sufficient to satisfy the job-related
and business-necessity standard, because the skills required to be an adequate firefighter
are not measurable by this type of test.
One could argue, on the other hand, that a written test might be important in assessing
the skills or knowledge of someone commanding a firefighting unit. The following is an
example of a written test question given to firefighters:
After an explosion in the living room of a residential home, a couch and the floor
beneath it are found to be severely damaged. While the windows are blown out
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and one of the walls slightly caved in, most of the furniture in the room is only
moderately damaged. These circumstances suggest that the damage was caused
by:
A) a high order concentrated explosion from some material such as dynamite
B) a diffuse explosion resulting from the ignition of a volatile liquid
C) a low order concentrated explosion, probably from a homemade bomb
D) a gas leak in the basement
E) gasoline on the couch
See FREE 50 QUESTION EXAM, DON MCNEA FIRE SCH. 3 (2017).
Second, Justice Ginsburg found that the examination in question may not have been
facially neutral after all. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 617 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). It may
have been constructed in a racially biased manner. Citing one expert, Janet Helms, a
professor of counseling psychology at Boston College, Justice Ginsburg observed that
“two-thirds of the incumbent fire officers who submitted job analyses to IOS during the
exam design phase were Caucasian. . . . The heavy reliance on job analyses from white
firefighters may thus have introduced an element of bias.” Id. Alternatively, this may
have been a situation where unbiased whites simply operated out of their cultural
perspective, a perspective that was oblivious to a black perspective on designing tests—
e.g., assessment centers, discussion to come. Id. at 614–16. Just because most of the test
designers were white does not mean that they were racist.
Third, Justice Ginsburg points to the statements made by Christopher Hornick, whose
credibility the Court questioned, in support of her belief that an equally valid, less
discriminatory evaluation process was available to the city. Id. at 615. Hornick, an examdesign expert with more than two decades of relevant experience, informed the CSB that
“an assessment center process, which is essentially an opportunity for candidates . . . to
demonstrate how they would address a particular problem as opposed to just verbally
saying it or identifying the correct option on a written test,” was a more valid and less
discriminatory way to test candidates than the 60/40 written/oral examination structure.
Id. Even though, as the Court noted, Hornick ultimately recommended that the CSB
should certify the examination results, he was emphatic that “a person’s leadership skills,
their command presence, their interpersonal skills, their management skills, their tactical
skills could have been identified and evaluated in a much more appropriate way.” Id. at
616. Justice Ginsburg notes that “it is unsurprising that most municipalities do not
evaluate their fire officer candidates as New Haven does. Although comprehensive
statistics are scarce, a 1996 study found that nearly two-thirds of surveyed municipalities
used assessment centers (‘simulations of the real world of work’) as part of their promotion
processes.” Id. at 634–35. The prevalence of the use of assessment centers by other
municipalities, their reliability, and their minimized adverse impact justify their validity
as an equally valid, less discriminatory alternative measuring process. Id. at 635.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Justice Ginsburg points to the Court’s failure to
take note of the city’s racial makeup and racial history. Id. at 608–09. New Haven is
about 60% African American and Hispanic and has a long history of racial discrimination
in the fire department. Id. at 609. At the time the examinations were given, only 18% of
the command structure in the fire department were minorities. Id. at 608–11. Blacks had
brought antidiscrimination lawsuits against the fire department in the past. Id. at 609.
Justice Ginsburg believed that the city’s racial makeup and racial history were very relevant
because they give context to the city’s mindset in throwing out the test results. The
defendant’s state of mind is the most important element regarding the intent test, which is
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Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision making in Ricci sustains systemic
racism by perpetuating a well-established pattern of black disadvantage
within the city of New Haven’s fire department. African Americans and
Latinx comprised about 60% of New Haven’s population.154 The city has
a long history of racial discrimination in the fire department, which gave
rise to civil rights lawsuits in the past. Only 18% of the command structure
in the fire department consisted of minorities at the time of the examinations.155
The Court’s decision in the case ignores or discounts these facts, leaving
intact the white power structure in the city’s fire department. In using the
color-blind norm to perpetuate a specific pattern of racial disadvantage in
a minority-majority city, the Court not only sustains systemic racism—
perpetuates said pattern of racial disadvantage—but also produces its
own, unique systemic racism. It does so by using one of its analytical
tools—the color-blind norm—to normalize racial disadvantage in the
context of its decision-making. The Supreme Court treats as normal
science judicial decision-making that disadvantages African Americans
so long as such decision-making is filtered through the color-blind norm.
IV. CONCLUSION
A complex concept describing a complex problem, systemic racism can
be defined as deeply entrenched patterns of black disadvantage/white
advantage in our country linked to slavery.156 It is manifested in myriad
ways,157 and it is sustained—protected or perpetrated—by socio-psychological
states—racial antipathy, the belief in white supremacy, insider or white
privilege, and implicit bias158—and institutional practices or policies.159
This Article focuses on some of the legal institutions, namely textualism
and the color-blind norm, complicit in manifestations of systemic racism.160
I will end with two thoughts.
First, it is a myth to think that racial justice has been achieved with the
death of Jim Crow. The passage of color-blind civil rights laws, the
proliferation of color-blind court decisions, the election of African Americans
to high office, and the presence of blacks in high places of employment
are not coextensive with racial justice—equity as illustrated in the

the legal theory on which the plaintiffs brought the action sub judice. Id. at 557 (majority
opinion).
154. Id. at 610 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 608–11.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 3–4.
157. See supra Part II.
158. See supra Part III.A.
159. See supra Part III.B.
160. See supra Part III.B.
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Appendix. They do not make America a post-racial society such that the
opportunities for worldly success and personal happiness for African
Americans is no longer limited by race. The fact is that the great majority
of African Americans continue to face recurring obstacles that the great
majority of white Americans simply do not have to face.161 Even African
Americans who have “made it,” such as Republican Senator Tim Scott,
continue to face racism.162 In addition, all African Americans are limited
by the Supreme Court’s decision making in civil rights cases, such as the
Court’s protection of private discrimination, in ways that white Americans
do not have to be concerned with.163 The refusal to acknowledge systemic
racism blinds one to racial disadvantage that is quite foundational.
Second, blissful ignorance of the full extent of racial disadvantage
directly affects one’s willingness to support laws and policies that further
racial justice, including affirmative action and voting right laws. “White
Americans generated more accurate estimates of Black–White equality
when asked to consider the persistence of race-based discrimination in
American society.”164 If rational and empathetic stakeholders—policymakers,
judges, lawyers, and Americans as a whole—are sufficiently educated
about both the reality of systemic racism and the myriad ways in which it
limits African Americans, then law, though sometimes complicit in
maintaining systemic racism, can be used to resist and redress systemic
racism. People of probity and intelligence must work to build a coalition
of the decent, firmly planting their feet in reality, and pointing them in the
direction of racial justice.165

161. See supra Part II.A.
162. See supra note 3.
163. See supra Part III.B.2. The argument that white Americans are also unprotected
from private discrimination misses the point, which is that white Americans face far less
debilitating private discrimination and racism, see supra Part III.A, than African Americans
and, hence, the absence of such protection does not impact their lives the way it impacts
black lives. African American communities are disproportionately burdened by
capital deficiencies. See supra Part II.A.
164. Michael W. Kraus, Julian M. Rucker & Jennifer A. Richeson, Americans
Misperceive Racial Economic Equality, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S. AM., 10,324,
10,324 (2017). This important study documents tremendous racial disparities across the
board. Its “findings suggest a profound misperception of and misplaced optimism regarding
contemporary societal racial economic equality—a misperception that is likely to have
important consequences for public policy.” Id.
165. The progressive pushback comes from the limited separatists who argue
that real racial progress is humanly impossible because such progress would disadvantage
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whites who, like most human beings, are more self-interested than altruistic. For a more
detailed discussion, see BROOKS, supra note 2, at 63–88.
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